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Abstract 
This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important 
analytical and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions 
about corporate governance in relation to the New International Financial 
Architecture; b) changes in the international competitive environment being 
caused by the enormous international merger movement in advanced countries.  
 
The background to a) above is the emergence of corporate governance as a key 
issue in the current G7 proposals for the New International Financial 
Architecture. The G7 emphasis on corporate governance can be traced back to 
the thesis that the ‘deeper’ reasons for the Asian crisis lay in the microeconomic 
behaviour of corporations and businesses in the affected countries. The failings 
of the corporate governance mechanisms and distortions in the competitive 
process have received special scrutiny in such analyses. 
 
With respect to b) above, the context is that the largest corporations in advanced 
countries are currently in the process of potentially cartelising the world market 
place through a spate of cross-border mergers and take-overs.  This huge merger 
movement raises serious policy concerns for developing countries. 
 
The paper's main conclusions are:  
 
1. The thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems 
of corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected 
countries is not supported by evidence. 
 
2. The Anglo-Saxon model of widely held corporations with dispersed share 
ownership is by far the exception in developing countries and in much of 
continental Europe. Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as 
well as European countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have 
successful records of fast long-term growth with different governance 
systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
3. Empirical evidence does not support the view that the Asian crisis 1997 to 
1999 was caused by crony capitalism. 
 
4. Corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s were broadly 
similar to those observed in the 1980s. Unlike their counterparts in advanced 
countries, large developing countries firms continued to rely 
overwhelmingly on external sources to finance their growth of total assets. 
 
5. The analysis of this paper does not support the claim that developing country 
conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and necessarily create 
moral hazard. It also indicates that contrary to widely held beliefs, product 
market competition in emerging countries is no less intense than in advanced 
economies. 
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 “The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world 
economy as the proper governing of countries.” James Wolfensohn, President 
World Bank 
 
I.  Introduction 
Since the dramatic events of the Asian financial crisis, followed by the financial 
crises in Russia and Brazil and the associated difficulties with the highly 
leveraged U.S. hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), there has 
been widespread concern in the G-7 industrial countries with the stability of the 
international financial system.  In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, many 
initiatives were launched to reform the system and establish, in former U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin’s phrase, a “New International Financial 
Architecture”.  However, with the abatement of the crisis, any interest in the 
serious reform of the international financial system if it ever existed appears to 
have evaporated.  Nevertheless, with the ostensible objective of preventing 
future crises, G-7 countries are continuing to press for reforms in developing 
countries with respect to their financial and economic systems.  The central G-7 
argument is that the proposed reforms in developing countries are essential to 
make the global markets function properly. The implicit suggestion is that the 
financial crises were not the outcome of market failures but rather the failure of 
developing country governments and institutions which did not provide accurate 
and adequate information to markets, and imposed other distortions on it. This 
thesis is not accepted by many economists, but nonetheless, such reforms were 
pressed on the crisis-affected Asian countries as part of IMF conditionality and 
are now being advocated for other developing countries.  Whether or not the G-
7 analysis is correct, given the distribution of political and economic power in 
world affairs, developing countries would be well advised to acquire a full 
understanding of the nature of the reforms being proposed and their 
implications for long-term economic development.  
 
This paper concentrates on two of the proposed subjects of reform. First, the 
question of corporate governance – how large enterprises are governed and 
operated in developing countries. Secondly, it is concerned with closely 
connected questions of domestic and international competition policies in an 
environment of liberalisation and globalisation. This paper will set out the main 
proposals which are being discussed in these areas and critically examine their 
implications specifically for long-term economic development. Developing 
countries are not generally exercised by these two issues in the way advanced 
countries are.  A large number of them do not have competition policies at all.  
Similarly, corporate governance has not been on the top of the development 
agenda for most developing countries.  The main purpose of this paper is to 
provide developing countries with an appreciation of the issues involved in the 
proposed reforms, so that they can make informed judgements about the 
desirability of their implementation, and, if necessary, formulate 
counterproposals. 
 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section II provides the essential background 
to the G-7 proposals on corporate governance which have their origins in the 
perceived structural weaknesses of the Asian economies on the eve of the crisis.  
This section also sets out the main proposals which are currently the subject of 
attention. Section III provides information on the systems of corporate 
governance which prevail in developing countries and how they differ from 
those in advanced economies. Section IV considers the role of large corporations 
in emerging markets and specifically how they are financed, a question which is 
closely related to corporate governance. Section V addresses one of the key 
areas of controversy: the efficiency and viability of large conglomerate 
organisations which are ubiquitous in developing countries on all continents.  
Should such organisations be forced to become more focused and shed their 
conglomerate characters? Section VI- IX take up the question of competition 
policy as well as the nature of competition in developing countries. The 
following specific issues addressed in this section are: 
 
(a) What is the relationship between competition in the product and capital 
markets, and corporate governance? 
 
(b) How intense is the competition in product markets of emerging economies? 
How does this compare with competition in advanced countries? 
 
(c)  Do developing countries need a competition policy? Should this competition 
policy be the same as in advanced countries? If not, how should it be 
different? 
 
(d) Will competition policy in developing countries be adequate to cope with the 
implications of the gigantic international merger movement led by advanced 
country firms which is currently sweeping the world economy. 
 
Finally, Section X concludes and draws together implications for economic 
policy. 
 
II.  The Asian financial crisis and corporate governance 
 
The impetus behind the quest for a new international financial architecture came 
from the crisis which erupted in Thailand in July 1997 and quickly spread to 
other Asian economies. Whereas previous crises had struck economies with a 
history of financial instability and low growth, such as Mexico in 1995, the 
Asian crisis devastated countries that were the fastest growing in the world 
economy and had solid achievements in technological upgrading and poverty 
reduction.  The international financial institutions and private commercial and 
investment banks had frequently cited them as prime examples of the benefits of 
export-led growth and the “market-friendly” approach to development. The 
shock among policymakers and market participants was therefore acute.   
 
After the initial shock of the crisis had worn off, however, an influential theory 
of the crisis emerged that argued that the deeper reasons of the crisis could be 
found in the institutional structures of the Asian model. This view was 
succinctly conveyed by Larry Summers, then the US Treasury Under Secretary, 
who argued that the roots of the Asian financial crisis did not lie in bad policy 
management but in the nature of the economies themselves. Summers stated 
that “[this crisis] is profoundly different because it has roots not in 
improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems that must be fixed are 
much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the private sector 
more and the public sector less (Financial Times, 20 February, 1998).”  This 
view was echoed in slightly different terms by the widely respected Chairman 
of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan:  
 
[In the last decade or so, the world has observed] a consensus 
towards, for want of a better term, the Western form of free-market 
capitalism as the model which should govern how each individual 
country should run its economy…We saw the breakdown of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 and the massive shift away from central 
planning towards free market capitalist types of structures.  
Concurrent to that was the really quite dramatic, very strong growth 
in what appeared to be a competing capitalist-type system in Asia.  
And as a consequence of that, you had developments of types of 
structures, which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you 
could not demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 
percent a year. (Greenspan, 1998) 
 
This “structuralist” interpretation of the Asian crisis was highly influential in 
the design of the policy response of the International Monetary Fund. As a 
consequence, the IMF conditioned its emergency loans on deep structural 
reforms that went far beyond the usual stabilisation measures, encompassing 
fundamental changes in labour regulations, corporate governance and the 
relationship between government and business. The scope of the IMF’s 
conditionality prompted the conservative economist Martin Feldstein to argue 
that the IMF “should not use the opportunity to impose other economic changes 
that, however helpful they may be, are not necessary to deal with the balance of 
payments problem and are the proper responsibility of the country’s own 
political system (Feldstein, 1998).” 
 
In spite of such concerns, the “structuralist” interpretation has continued to 
underpin policy proposals and framed the academic debate on the issue.  This 
view consists of several interlinked arguments. First, fragile financial systems 
resulted from relationship banking, weak corporate governance structures and 
lack of competition. Johnson et al. (2000) argue that measures of corporate 
governance and in particular the effectiveness of protection for minority 
shareholders, explain the extent of the exchange rate depreciation and stock 
market decline better than standard macroeconomic measures.  Furthermore, the 
crony-istic relations between financial institutions, business and the government 
shielded the system from market discipline and encouraged the over-investment 
that led to the crisis. Second, and related to the first point, the high leverage 
ratios of Asian firms heightened their vulnerability and created the conditions 
that led to a sudden crisis. Thirdly, the lack of transparency and the poor quality 
of information in such an insider-dominated system led to informational 
asymmetries that exacerbated the crisis. Markets did not have adequate 
information about the true financial status of the corporations and the banks.  
Thus, once the market began to assess the true facts, there was a collapse of 
confidence.  As the former managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, 
argued: 
 
In Korea, for example, opacity had become systemic. The lack of 
transparency about government, corporate and financial sector 
operations concealed the extent of Korea’s problems – so much so 
that corrective action came too late and ultimately could not prevent 
the collapse of market confidence, with the IMF finally being 
authorised to intervene just days before potential bankruptcy. 
(Speech to Transparency International, reported in the IMF Survey, 
9 February, 1998). 
 
To remedy these alleged faults in the Asian system, reformers sought to 
dissolve the close links between the state and business, create an arm’s length 
relationship between banks and business and to promote greater transparency in 
economic relations. 
 
The “structuralist” interpretation is not, however, the only account of the Asian 
crisis, nor the most persuasive. Singh and Weisse, (1999) have argued that the 
“structuralist” interpretation is not credible for several reasons.  First, it does not 
explain the previous exemplary success of the Asian economies. As Paul 
Krugman has remarked: “But if the system was so flawed, why did it work so 
well for so long, then fail so suddenly?” (Krugman, 1999).  Second, it does not 
explain why countries such as China and, especially, India, with similar systems 
did not have a crisis.   
 
A more credible explanation of the crisis that encompasses these facts is that the 
afflicted economies dismantled their controls over the borrowing of the private 
sector and embraced financial liberalisation. As a consequence, the private 
sector built up short-term foreign currency debt that often found its way into the 
non-tradable sector and into speculative real estate ventures.  Accompanying 
financial liberalisation was the irrational exuberance and contagion that are 
always latent in private international financial flows. In sum, Singh and 
Weisseargue that the crisis occurred not because the Asian model has been 
flawed but precisely because it was not being followed. Thus, while Edmund 
Phelps identifies the crisis with the failure of Asian corporatism (Phelps, 1999), 
it can be argued that in reality this system underpinned the most successful 
industrialisation drive in history and dramatically reduced poverty. The system, 
however, was vulnerable to the forces unleashed by financial liberalisation.  
 
In this paper, two key elements of the Greenspan-Summers “structuralist” 
interpretation will, inter alia, be examined in detail. The first is the contention 
that there was poor corporate governance resulting from crony capitalism that, 
together with the lack of competition in product markets, led to a disregard of 
profits and hence to over-investment and, ultimately, to the crisis. The following 
sections will outline the nature of the differences in the systems of corporate 
governance between developing and industrial countries, variations within each 
group, as well as implications for economic efficiency of these diverse 
systems/institutions. Secondly, a later section will examine evidence on the 
intensity of competition in the product markets of Asian and other developing 
countries.  
 
III. The New International Financial Architecture and Corporate 
Governance 
 
In a move towards defining a New International Financial Architecture, the G-7 
assigned the task of reforming corporate governance to the OECD and the 
World Bank. The main results so far of this initiative have been the following: 
(a) OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (see Appendix 1); 
(b) OECD/World Bank Compact on the Reform of Corporate Governance; 
(c) the Corporate Governance Forum meetings between officials and 
businessmen; 
(d) ‘self-assessment’ exercises in corporate governance carried out under the 
guidance of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.  
(e) the World Bank is organising investor surveys asking domestic and 
international investors the private sector’s response to the progress and 
credibility of reform. 
 
The five basic principles of corporate governance promoted by the 
OECD/World Bank initiative have been summarized in the World Bank’s main 
document on corporate governance, Corporate Governance: A Framework for 
Implementation (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000).  The study points out that the 
principles have been based on tenets of “fairness, transparency, accountability 
and responsibility”.      
 
Protection of shareholder rights to share in company profits, receive 
information about the company, and influence the firm through 
shareholder meetings and voting. 
 
Equitable treatment of shareholders, especially minority and foreign 
shareholders, with full disclosure of material information and prohibition 
of abusive self-dealing and insider trading. 
 
Protection of stakeholder rights as spelled out in contracts and in labour 
and insolvency laws, in a framework that allows stakeholder 
participation in performance-enhancing mechanisms, gives stakeholders 
access to relevant company information, and allows effective redress for 
violations of stakeholder rights. 
 
Timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all matters 
material to company performance, as essential to market-based 
monitoring of companies, and shareholders’ ability to exercise voting 
rights, with accounting according to quality standards of disclosure and 
audit, and with objective auditing by independent assessors. 
 
Diligent exercise of the board of directors’ responsibilities to guide 
corporate strategy, to manage the firms’ executive functions (such as 
compensation, business plans, and executive employment), to monitor 
managerial performance and achieve an adequate return for investors, to 
implement systems for complying with applicable laws (tax, labour, 
competition, environment), to prevent conflicts of interest and to balance 
competing demands on the company, and with some independence from 
managers to consider the interests of all stakeholders in the company, 
treat them fairly, and give them access to information. 
 
The World Bank report does go to some lengths to point out that “there is no 
one-size-fits-all blueprint for corporate governance”.  Furthermore, it explicitly 
states – although only in a footnote that can be found only by careful reading - 
that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is not the model it seeks to 
impose elsewhere:  
 
The report does not advocate one form of ownership structure over 
another and certainly not the Anglo-US models.  These markets 
have developed over time in response to investor needs, 
institutional capacity and the investing preferences of the 
population.  They cannot be easily copied in other environments.  
(footnote 1, p.53) 
 
The report also states that the model should be prepared by each country 
according to the above principles and that it should be “nationally owned”.   
 
However, the entire thrust of the report’s arguments and its definition of “best 
practice” structures detailed in the appendices to the report, belies any assertion 
that the it treats the different models of corporate governance equally.  It is 
indeed hard to find much daylight between the report’s conception of “best 
practice” and the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, which leaves 
little doubt that it is the preferred system.  Furthermore, the genesis of the 
corporate governance project was a questionable analysis of the Asian crisis on 
which far-reaching policy proposals have been based.  The overarching theme 
of this orthodox analysis, as noted earlier, was one based on marketisation, 
arm’s-length relationships and transparency.   
 
The current “self-assessment” exercises under the guidance of the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank have already identified salient problems in 
corporate governance systems: lack of effective oversight by boards of 
directors, poor disclosure, weak compliance with regulatory and statutory 
requirements, tight insider control, and shareholder and creditor passivity.  
Further results along these lines can be expected as the World Bank is 
organising investor surveys asking domestic and international investors the 
private sector’s response to the progress and credibility of reform.      
 
In summary, there is considerable activity in international fora with respect to 
identifying best practice codes for corporate governance.  Developing countries 
know from past experience that today’s best practice often becomes tomorrow’s 
conditionality if a country has the misfortune of requiring IMF assistance.  
Advanced emerging markets in particular must, therefore, pro-actively engage 
in the proceedings of the Global Corporate Governance Forum and the Regional 
Corporate Governance Roundtables that the OECD and the World Bank are 
jointly organizing.  One reason for doing this is that the private sector which is 
involved in these activities in many countries does not appear to be fully 
appreciative of the subtle issues involved in examining the question of corporate 
governance.  It is not unusual to find that business school economists in private 
sector organisations in developing countries, who usually have a narrow view of 
the subject, put forward proposals for a market-based system of stock market 
governance which are even more extreme than those suggested by the 
international financial institutions.1   
 
IV. Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: the Facts 
 
The analysis of corporate governance structures in developing countries has 
long been hindered by a lack of detailed information.  One benefit to arise from 
the Asian crisis and the focus of the international financial institutions on 
governance structures has been the assembling of a large body of evidence on 
corporate governance structures in developing countries at the World Bank.  
This has included information on the structure of share ownership and corporate 
governance laws.  Thus, we are now in a position to construct a more informed 
picture of the governance structures in a wide range of developing countries. 
 
Patterns of share ownership and control of large corporations in developed and 
emerging markets 
 
One of the key insights to emerge from the new empirical studies is that the 
widely-held corporation described in the classic study by Berle and Means, 
(1933) is an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon.  As Table 1 indicates, among 
developing countries, the share of family-controlled2 firms in the top 20 
publicly-traded companies in Mexico, Hong Kong and Argentina are 100%, 
70% and 65% respectively.  In contrast, in the U.K. the top 20 quoted 
companies are 100% widely-held.  However, among developed countries there 
is a diversity of structures.  In Sweden and Portugal, 45% of the top twenty 
publicly-traded firms are family-controlled, while in Greece and Belgium the 
figure is 50%.  Even in the United States the share of family-controlled, firms is 
20% of the top 20 publicly traded firms.   
 
Table 1. Control of publicly traded firms around the world, 1996 (per cent) 
      
Economy Widely 
held 
Family 
owned 
State 
owned 
Widely held 
financial 
Widely held 
corporation 
      
OECD countries       
(non-Bank borrower)      
      
Australia 65 5 5  25 
Austria 5 15 70   
Belguim 5 50 5 30  
Canada 60 25   15 
Denmark 40 35 15   
Finland 35 10 35 5 5 
France 60 20 15 5  
Germany 50 10 25 15  
Greece 10 50 30 10  
Ireland 65 10   10 
Italy 20 15 40 5 10 
Japan 90 5 5   
Netherlands 30 20 5  10 
New Zealand 30 25 25  20 
Norway 25 25 35 5  
Portugal 10 45 25 15 0 
Spain 35 15 30 10 10 
Sweden 25 45 10 15  
Switzerland 60 3  5  
UK 100     
USA 80 20    
      
Bank borrowers and others     
      
Argentina  65 15 5 15 
Hong Kong 10 70 5 5  
Israel 5 50 40  5 
Mexico  100    
Singapore 15 30 45 5 5 
Korea, Rep. of 55 20 15  5 
      
      
Source: Iskander and Chamlou     
 
In terms of state ownership and control of large firms, the picture is similarly 
complex.  In Israel and Singapore, nearly half (40% and 45%, respectively) of 
the top 20 publicly-traded firms were state controlled.  In the major OECD 
economies, this figure ranges from zero in the US and the U.K., to 25% in 
Germany and 40% in Italy. Among the smaller advanced economies there is a 
similar range, with Austrian state-run corporations controlling a 70% share of 
the top 20 publicly-traded firms. It is therefore not surprising that Russia now 
has a higher degree of private ownership than many Western European 
countries.   
 
Table 2 provides evidence from Asian countries assembled by Claessens et al., 
(2000) which is based on a very large sample of nearly 3,000 publicly-traded 
firms in nine countries.  It indicates that when 10% equity ownership is defined 
as control, Japan is the only country with the Berle and Means-style system of 
dispersed share ownership (42% of publicly-traded firms), but with an 
additional 38.5% of firms controlled by widely-held financial institutions.  At 
the 10% level, most other countries had systems dominated by families: 
Indonesia (68.6%), Korea (67.9%), Taiwan (65.6%), Malaysia (57.5%) and 
Thailand (56.5%).   When control is defined at the 20% level, the Berle and 
Means widely-held system becomes more pronounced, as many families in 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have family ownership of between 10% and 20% of 
the equity. However, even after redefining control, family-controlled 
corporations still account for 48.4% of publicly-traded companies in Korea and 
48.2% in Taiwan.  Moreover, in other countries the share of family-controlled 
firms (as a share of the total number of firms under ‘control’) increases with the 
redefinition of control. In Indonesia the class of family-controlled firms 
increases at the expense of state, widely-held financial and widely-held 
corporate control.  In Thailand, family control increases from 57.7% to 67.2% 
and in Malaysia from 57.7% to 67.2% with the change of definition for control. 
(Claessens et al., 2000, p.104).   
 
An interesting variant is provided by the typical pattern of share ownership and 
control in large Indian firms – the Business Groups.  Table 3 shows that for the 
top 40, directors and the families held only 22.4 per cent of shares.  Financial 
institutions and banks held 27.9 per cent.  Since all these financial institutions 
were controlled by the government and in many of these largest corporations the 
government had, effectively, a controlling shareholding. However, traditionally, 
Indian financial institutions support the owning family unless the company 
performance was exceptionally poor. 
Table2.  Control of publicly traded companies in East Asia
Country Number of 
corporations
Widely held Family State Widely held 
financial
Widely held 
corporation
10% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 0.6 64.7 3.7 7.1 23.9
Indonesia 178 0.6 68.6 10.2 3.8 16.8
Japan 1240 42.0 13.1 1.1 38.5 5.3
Korea 345 14.3 67.9 5.1 3.5 9.2
Malaysia 238 1.0 57.5 18.2 12.1 11.2
Philippines 120 1.7 42.1 3.6 16.8 35.9
Singapore 221 1.4 52.0 23.6 10.8 12.2
Taiwan 141 2.9 65.6 3.0 10.4 18.1
Thailand 167 2.2 56.5 7.5 12.8 21.1
20% cutoff
Hong Kong 330 7.0 66.7 1.4 5.2 19.8
Indonesia 178 5.1 71.5 8.2 2.0 13.2
Japan 1240 79.8 9.7 0.8 6.5 3.2
Korea 345 43.2 48.4 1.6 0.7 6.1
Malaysia 238 10.3 67.2 13.4 2.3 6.7
Philippines 120 19.2 44.6 2.1 7.5 26.7
Singapore 221 5.4 55.4 23.5 4.1 11.5
Taiwan 141 26.2 48.2 2.8 5.3 17.4
Thailand 167 6.6 61.6 8.0 8.6 15.3
Note: Newly assembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and 
non-financial institutions) as based on Worldscope and supplemented with information from
country-specific sources.  In all cases, Claessens et al. collected the ownership structure as of the 
end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible date.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.103.
 
 
Table 3. Proportion of ownership in India (44 companies)
Quartile Foreign Government Corporate Directors Public Total
Quartile 1 16.1 28.9 23.1 1.1 30.8 100
Quartile 2 24.3 25.6 25.6 1.2 23.3 100
Quartile 3 20.7 23.9 17.9 0.7 36.8 100
Quartile 4 22.9 33 19.2 1 23.8 100
Total 19 27.9 22.4 1.1 29.6 100
Note:
1.  Foreign refers to foreign collaborators, foreign institutional investors, foreign OCBs, foreign others and 
     NRIs.
2.  Government refers to all public financial institutions, including central and state banks.
3.  Corporate refers to promoters, subsidary companies and holding companies.
4.  Directors refers to directors and relatives.
5. Public refers to general public companies.
 
 
Evidence also suggests that in Asia firms controlled by families are most likely 
to have a separation between ownership and control.  Table 4 presents the 
mean-ratios of cash-flow over control rights for a sample of Asian economies.  
A low ratio indicates that the control rights exceed the cash-flow rights and thus 
measure the degree of corporate “pyramiding”. The table indicates that in all 
countries except for Japan and Singapore, family-controlled firms have the most 
separation between ownership and control. In Japan, firms controlled by 
financial institutions have the most separation (0.495). The pattern across 
company size is less clear, but it appears that small firms are most likely to have 
a larger wedge between cash flow and control rights, regardless of the type of 
ownership.  In three countries, however, (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), There 
is a greater separation of ownership and control among the twenty largest 
family-controlled firms. 
 
Crony capitalism 
Claessens et al., (2000) also present evidence (reported in Table 5) on the 
degree to which family-controlled firms account for GDP.  As noted earlier, the 
orthodox argument in the wake of the Asian crisis argued that “crony 
capitalism” – the complex of relationships between large family capitalists and 
their government allies – created the conditions for economic collapse.  
However, the evidence indicates that there is no direct link between the share of 
GDP controlled by family firms and performance.  In Hong Kong, the top 15 
families controlled 84.2 percent of GDP in 1996 while in Singapore and 
Malaysia the respective figures were 48.3% and 76.2%.  Hong Kong and 
Singapore were both able to weather the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 while 
the Malaysia experienced a sharp downturn and currency crash.  Similarly, 
Taiwan’s top 15 families control 17% of GDP and the country avoided the 
financial crisis while the top 15 families in Korea account for 12.9% of GDP 
and country experienced a sharp contraction and currency depreciation in late 
1997 and early 1998.  Thus, crony capitalism, while it certainly exists, cannot 
be reduced simplistically to the extent of influence of family-controlled groups 
in the economy.   
 
A similar story applies when we measure the influence of the top 15 families by 
their ownership of corporate assets, although in this case the top 15 families 
control 38.4% of the corporate assets in Korea compared to 20.1% in Taiwan 
(this, however, reflects the more concentrated industrial structure in Korea and 
the dominance of large firms in its stock market).  It should be noted that such 
concentrations of economic power in a set of families is not necessarily 
antithetical to the efficient functioning, transparency and democratic 
accountability of the industrial system, as the case of the highly influential 
Wallenberg family in Sweden indicates. It is believed that the Wallenberg’s 
control up to 60% of Sweden’s industrial capital, and consequently, little is 
done in the country which does not have their approval. Furthermore, as Berglof 
and von Thadden note, crony capitalism is not a corporate governance problem 
in a strict sense since family owners are likely to have the right incentives in 
their firms (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999). Crony capitalism is rather a 
product of the complex of relations between the business and political elites and 
could in principle arise in systems with widely dispersed ownership.  Taken 
collectively, the prevalence of family-controlled firms in developing counties 
suggests that they are an effective vehicle of late development and 
industrialisation and that they remain prominent in many advanced economies.3      
Table 4.  The separation of ownership and control across type of the largest
controlling shareholder and company size
Country Category Family State Widely held 
financial
Widely held 
corporation
Hong Kong All firms 0.826 1.000 0.876 0.993
Largest 20 0.832 1.000 0.656 n.a.
Middle 50 0.886 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.805 1.000 1.000 0.988
Indonesia All firms 0.687 1.000 1.000 0.949
Largest 20 0.741 1.000 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.677 1.000 1.000 0.927
Smallest 50 0.702 n.a. n.a. 1.000
Japan All firms 0.984 1.000 0.495 0.943
Largest 20 1.000 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.956
Smallest 50 0.983 n.a. 0.446 0.867
Korea All firms 0.833 1.000 1.000 0.986
Largest 20 0.619 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.807 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.861 n.a. n.a. 1.000
Malaysia All firms 0.785 0.959 1.000 0.895
Largest 20 0.942 0.871 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.787 1.000 1.000 0.752
Smallest 50 0.795 0.692 1.000 0.789
Philippines All firms 0.819 0.914 0.965 0.956
Largest 20 0.878 1.000 n.a. 1.000
Middle 50 0.837 1.000 0.932 0.938
Smallest 50 0.775 0.742 0.909 0.975
Singapore All firms 0.722 0.685 0.956 0.944
Largest 20 0.604 0.794 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.693 0.659 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.768 0.655 1.000 0.907
Taiwan All firms 0.757 1.000 0.989 0.922
Largest 20 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000
Middle 50 0.704 1.000 1.000 0.904
Smallest 50 0.763 n.a. 0.969 0.894
Thailand All firms 0.920 1.000 1.000 1.000
Largest 20 0.969 1.000 n.a. n.a.
Middle 50 0.935 1.000 1.000 1.000
Smallest 50 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note:  Newly assembled data for publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions) as collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the 
closest possible date.  Controlling shareholders are defined at the 20% (benchmark) cutoff.  Size is 
as the largest 20 firms, the median 50 firms, and the smallest 50 firms in terms of market capitalization.
Widely held firms are excluded from the sample.  The reported numbers represent the mean ratio of
cash-flow over control rights.  When no firms fit the category, it is marked "n.a.".
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.102.
             
Table 5.  How concentrated is family control?
Country Average number   % of total value of listed corporate assets % of GDP
of firms per family            that families control (1996) 1996
Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 15
family families families families families
Hong Kong 2.36 6.5 26.2 32.2 34.4 84.2
Indonesia 4.09 16.6 40.7 57.7 61.7 21.5
Japan 1.04 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.1
Korea 2.07 11.4 29.7 36.8 38.4 12.9
Malaysia 1.97 7.4 17.3 24.8 28.3 76.2
Philippines 2.68 17.1 42.8 52.5 55.1 46.7
Singapore 1.26 6.4 19.5 26.6 29.9 48.3
Taiwan 1.17 4.0 14.5 18.4 20.1 17.0
Thailand 1.68 9.4 32.2 46.2 53.3 39.3
Note: Newly asembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions).  The data was collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible 
date.  The "average number of firms per family" refers only to firms in the sample.  To avoid discrepancies in the cross-
country comparison due to different sample coverage, we have scaled down the control holdings of each family group
in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing from our sample are not controlled by any of the largest
15 families.  The percent of total GDP is calculated using market capiotalization and GDP data from the World Bank.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.108.
 
 
V.  The Theoretical  Foundations of the OECD/World Bank Proposals on 
Corporate Governance 
 
The World Bank’s preference for the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance is based on what they regard as “best practice”.   Conspicuously, it 
is not based on systematic theoretical analysis or rigorous empirical research.   
However, a recent series of papers by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny (hereafter referred to as LLSV) on 
law and finance has helped fill these theoretical and empirical lacunae.   
 
The LLSV thesis 
The central proposition of the by now fairly extensive literature generated by 
LLSV and their colleagues is that there is a systematic causal relationship 
between the legal framework, the corporate financing patterns, corporate 
behaviour and performance, and overall economic growth.4  More specifically, 
it argues that the greater the protection afforded to minority shareholders and 
creditors, the more external financing firms will be able to obtain.  Through a 
variety of mechanisms this greater access to external finance modifies corporate 
behaviour and improves performance, which then has a positive impact on 
aggregate economic growth.   
 
The LLSV analysis is based on an empirical and theoretical evaluation of 
different legal systems whose historical origins are exogenous (or, in the case of 
LDCs, they are a legacy of colonial rule). The studies differentiate between four 
types of law systems: Anglo-Saxon “common law” (as practiced in the US and 
other former British colonies), French “civil law”, and German and 
Scandinavian legal traditions (which are in general closer to the French “civil 
law” tradition). The main analysis focuses on the differences between the 
common and civil law traditions.   
 
A distinguishing characteristic of these contributions is their strong empirical 
emphasis. The empirical results presented by LLSV indicate that the predictions 
of the legal origin model are verified by the data. Specifically, they argue that 
the lack of protection for minority shareholders, as is the case in the French civil 
law countries, leads to concentration of share ownership, a point that the data 
indicate is correct. Similarly, they suggest that other things being equal, 
corporations in common law countries pay out more dividends and have higher 
share prices than firms in civil law countries.  In addition, the evidence – in 
conformity with the theory – indicates that there has been a faster development 
of stock markets under a common law legal system than under the civil law 
system.  In point of fact, however, their claim is even more ambitious: that the 
legal system provides a better classification of countries  than the distinction 
between “bank-based” and “stock market-based” financial systems.   
 
Table 6 provides data on the origins of the legal system and investor rights in 49 
countries from the LLSV sample. Panels A and B provide measures of 
shareholder and creditor protection, respectively, while Panel C reports 
measures of enforcement capability. It is evident from the table that there are 
clear differences in all these spheres between the common law and civil law 
countries.  Specifically, the evidence reported indicates that civil law countries 
have low accounting standards, more corruption, less efficient judicial systems 
and poor protection for creditors and shareholders. These reported 
inefficiencies, it is argued, lead to poor corporate governance and lower 
economic growth.   
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Legal origin and investors rights 
Variables
Common law 
(18 countries)
French civil 
law (21 
countries)
German civil law 
(6 countries)
Scandinavian 
civil law            
(4 countries)
World average 
(49 countries)
Panel A: Measures of shreholder protection
Antidirector rights index 4.00 2.33 2.33 3.00 3.00
Proxy by mail 39% 5% 0% 25% 18%
Shares not blocked before meeting 100% 57% 17% 100% 71%
Cumulative voting/proportional rep. 28% 29% 33% 0% 27%
Oppressed minority 94% 29% 50% 0% 53%
Preemptive right to new issues 44% 62% 33% 75% 53%
% share of capital to call and ESM<10 94% 52% 0% 0% 78%
Panel B: Measures of creditor protection
Creditor rights index 3.11 1.58 2.33 2.00 2.30
No automatic stay on secured assets 72% 26% 67% 25% 49%
Secured creditors first 89% 65% 100% 100% 81%
Paid restrictions for going into reorganization 72% 42% 33% 75% 55%
Management does not stay in reorganization 78% 26% 33% 0% 45%
Panel C: Measures of enforcement
 
 
 
The policy implication that LLSV draw from this analysis is that countries 
should move toward the more efficient common law system based on 
transparency and arm’s length relationships. It is argued, however, that this 
would not be easy given the vested interests connected with concentrated share 
ownership who could frustrate any government attempt to dilute their equity 
stakes. Governments are therefore advised to carry out the reforms in a much 
more indirect and subtle way that challenges the influence of the conglomerates.   
 
The Berglof and von Thadden Critique 
 
There are two significant lines of criticism that can be directed against this body 
of thought. The first, articulated by  Berglof and von Thadden,(1999) finds the 
theoretical framework presented in LLSV far too limited for examining 
corporate governance issues in developing countries. At an empirical level, they 
argue that the LLSV characterization of corporate governance in these countries 
is not only too narrow but also misleading.   
 
The focus of the analysis on protecting minority shareholders and creditors is 
too narrow, Berglof and von Thadden contend, to be even applied to most 
European countries, let alone developing countries. LLSV appear to be solely 
interested in the question of the protection of providers of external finance to the 
exclusion of other significant stakeholders in the firm. In particular, there is no 
mention of labour laws or the equally vital relationships between workers and 
managers, suppliers and owners/managers, local communities and the 
corporation as well as the government and the corporation.  In effect, all these 
relationships are ignored while the protection of external financing is placed, 
alone, in the centre of the analysis. Thus, any sense of the structures in which 
the firm is embedded and which determine its performance and competitiveness 
is expunged from consideration and we are led to place a disproportionate 
weight to one - potentially small - aspect of this structure. Berglof and von 
Thadden do not regard external finance as the only, or even the principal, 
constraint on firm growth (see, however, Section VI on this point).  
 
Berglof and von Thadden also note that the reference point for the LLSV study 
is the widely-held, Berle and Means-type corporation which is prevalent mainly 
in the United States and the United Kingdom (as was indicated by the analysis 
in section IV).  In the developing country context, they point out that the LLSV 
paradigm is valid and relevant only for the case of transitional economies, 
which is not entirely surprising given the fact that some of the LLSV authors 
were intimately involved in Russian reforms in the 1990s.  The former Russian 
state-owned sector has been dominated by owners/managers who have benefited 
from insider privatisations and who have often effectively expropriated outside 
investors who often have to play a central role in the implementation of painful 
restructuring (Berglof and von Thadden, p.24).  In this context, Berglof and von 
Thadden argue, improved investor protection can be very useful in attracting 
outside capital and forcing restructuring.   
 
The typical firm in developing countries, however, is a family-controlled or 
closely-held by block holders, i.e. it has concentrated share ownership.  The 
important corporate governance problem for this class of firms is not legal 
protection for outside shareholders but rather the problems of family succession 
and maintaining family control while raising funds from outside investors.   
 
The LLSV argument is also susceptible to the fact that the direction of causality 
between legal system and financial structure could run in either direction.  The 
legal system may lead to the formation of a certain financial structure, as LLSV 
maintain, but it is at least equally plausible that the financial structure may also 
lead to the creation of legal norms. In the latter view, the law accommodates 
larger structural changes taking place in the economy, financial markets and 
politics.  To therefore argue, as LLSV do, for the primacy of legal origins in 
financial market development is to place the cart before the horse.     
 
It is important to note that even on its own terms, maximising investor 
protection cannot be optimal.  It will result in the dilution of efficiency 
advantages deriving from the lower agency costs of concentrated ownership.  A 
system which is also more oriented towards investor protection may also lead to 
familiar problems of short-termism which often characterise firms in the Anglo-
Saxon stock market economies which result in lower levels of investment and 
an emphasis on financial engineering (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1990; Porter, 
1992; Singh, 2000).    
 
The Glen, Lee and Singh analysis 
The second and rather different critical line of argument against the central 
LLSV thesis has been presented by Glen, Lee and Singh (2000).  They suggest 
that over the past 20 years there have been major changes in corporate financing 
patterns and in stock market development in emerging markets.  It would be 
difficult to attribute these enormous variations, as detailed below, to changes in 
corporate law or to legal origin.  This will be illustrated by considering the 
specific experience of India, a pre-eminently common law based country.  
Despite this fact, in accordance with political decisions of the Indian leadership 
the stock market up to 1980 played hardly any role in the economy.  Stock 
market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP was a mere 5 percent until then.  
The government began a change in its economic policy stance in the early 1980s 
and began to implement financial liberalisation internally.  However, following 
the balance of payments and liquidity crisis of 1990-1991, the government 
initiated a more full-scale internal as well as external liberalisation.  The net 
result was that there was a stock market boom.  Total market capitalisation rose 
from 5% in 1980 to 13% in 1990 and to 40% in 1993.  There were two million 
mutual fund investors in India in 1980 but by 1995 there were over 40 million, 
second only to the US.  The number of companies listed on the Indian stock 
markets rose to nearly 8,000, a figure bigger than that for the US, the largest 
developed country market.  Hundreds of companies made IPOs as well as a 
large number of existing listed companies raised fresh equity finance on the 
stock market.   
 
These enormous changes in stock market development and financing of Indian 
corporations occurred in a brief space of time without any fundamental changes 
in India’s constitution or basic legal framework (see Singh, 1998a).   
 
India, however, is not a special case.  Other emerging markets (for example, 
Taiwan, Mexico, Thailand and Malaysia) in the 1980s also recorded enormous 
increases in stock market activity in the wake of financial liberalisation.  Again, 
this was not a response to changes in the basic legal framework from a civil law 
to a common law regime (Singh, 1997; Singh and Weisse, 1998).  Rather it was 
the result of the deliberate change in economic policy.  Laws were changed to 
accommodate economic policy decisions without altering their fundamental 
framework.  Obviously, there will be examples of the opposite kind where the 
legal framework has led changes in economic institutions.  There is thus likely 
to be a mutually interactive relationship between laws and economic policy.  
LLSV greatly overstate their case by asserting a one-way causal relationship.   
 
The LLSV legal origin approach is thus unable to account for the huge changes 
in corporate financing patterns and stock market development within emerging 
markets over time.  So that even if we accepted that legal origin may explain 
some of the cross-sectional variations between developing countries, it is not 
helpful in explaining the much more important structural changes that have 
been taking place in emerging markets over the last two decades.   
 
Finally, the LLSV analysis also requires us to accept that countries with a civil 
law tradition and, consequently, less protection for outside investors, have been 
either willing to accept or ignorant of the economic costs of their legal system.  
If they had been rational, Germany and France would have imported a common 
law system decades ago and even experienced higher rates of growth.  In view 
of the fact that over the last century economic growth in Japan and Germany 
was faster and that of France was comparable to those in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies, such an argument strains credulity.5  
 
VI.  Corporate governance and corporate finance in emerging markets 
1990s versus 1980s 
  
The last section touched on issues of corporate finance in the context of a 
critique of the LLSV approach to law and finance.  Here we shall report more 
directly on corporate financing patterns in developing countries.  As is implicit 
in the previous discussion, there is a close relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate finance.  Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance in terms of the rules and procedures which ensures that 
external investors and creditors in a company can get their money back and will 
not simply be expropriated by those who are managing the company. 
 
Two of the first large-scale empirical studies of the financing of corporate 
growth in emerging markets were Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) 
(henceforward, both studies will be referred to as S-H).  The two studies arrived 
at surprising conclusions.  One would have expected, a priori, that because of 
the underdevelopment and imperfections of developing country capital markets, 
firms in these countries would largely be self-financing.  However, these two 
studies produced results that were quite contrary to these expectations.  Large 
developing country firms, it was found, depended overwhelmingly on external 
rather than internal finance, and used equity financing to a surprisingly large 
degree (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7. The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets during the  
1980s 
 
Country Internal finance External finance
(equity) 
External finance 
LTD 
Brazil 56.4 36.0 7.7 
India 40.5 19.6 39.9 
Jordan 66.3 22.1 11.6 
Malaysia 35.6 46.6 17.8 
Mexico 24.4 66.6 9.0 
Pakistan 74.0 1.7 24.3 
Republic of 
Korea 
19.5 49.6 30.9 
Thailand  27.7 NA NA 
Turkey 15.3 65.1 19.6 
Zimbabwe 58.0 38.8 3.2 
All 38.8 39.3 20.8 
F1 20.0* 31.4* 21.2* 
F2 16.69* 18.93* 6.38* 
 
Note:  
1. F-statistic for comparison of means across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the equality of means 
2. Bartlett-Box F-statistic for variance across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of 
the null hypothesis of equality of variance. 
 
Source: Singh 1995. 
 
Table 7 suggests that during the 1980s the average company among the 100 
largest listed manufacturing firms in each country, in a sample of ten emerging 
markets, financed merely 40 per cent of its growth of net assets from retained 
profits. About 60 per cent of corporate growth in the sample of emerging markets 
was financed by external sources – 40 per cent from new equity capital and 20 per 
cent from long-term debt. Even though the equity financing figures were to some 
extent overstated by virtue of the fact that an indirect method of estimation was 
used (on account of lack of direct information), these figures were much larger 
than might have been expected a priori.6 In advanced economies with well-
developed capital markets, the typical large firm is thought to follow a ‘pecking 
order’ in which most of the needed finance for growth us obtained from retained 
profits. If additional resources are required, the firm would borrow funds and only 
as a last resort would it issue new shares in the equity market. 
 
In explaining these results for emerging markets, Singh (1995a) hypothesized 
that the much greater recourse to external finance in developing country 
corporations was due to the faster growth of these firms relative to those in 
advanced countries and therefore had a greater need for external capital.  On the 
supply side, such finance was forthcoming at least for the large developing 
country firms through government-directed finance, while it was the small firms 
that faced credit rationing.  However, he explained the surprisingly high use of 
equity finance in conjunctural terms:   
 
a) the direct role of the governments in stimulating stock market 
development in many emerging countries so as to facilitate 
privatisation; 
b) external and internal financial liberalisation which often lead both to a 
stock market boom and to higher real interest rates; the former 
lowered the cost of equity capital whilst the latter increased the cost of 
debt finance. 
 
Singh suggested that once these temporary factors cease to operate, the situation 
would revert to the normal low levels of equity financing.  Most of the factors 
that lead corporations in advanced economies to avoid new share issues, such as 
asymmetric information apply, mutatis mutandis, to developing countries as 
well. In addition, the desire of wealthy families in developing countries to retain 
control over large firms also militates against the use of equity finance.  
Similarly, the greater volatility of share prices observed, as well as expected, in 
developing country stock markets should discourage the use of equity finance.  
 
Have the corporate financing patterns in emerging markets changed in the 1990s 
compared with the 1980s?  If so, have they changed in the direction indicated 
above – that is, do they suggest that the conjunctural factors have ceased to 
operate or are less applicable? Tables 8, 9a and 9b attempt to answer this 
question for four emerging markets. The tables are based on the WorldScope 
dataset for individual listed corporations for four countries, India, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. The dataset provides information for only the 1990s so 
that a direct comparison of these results to those of Singh (1995) and Singh and 
Hamid (1992) for the 1980s must be made carefully and with due regard to the 
intrinsic differences in the datasets. 
 
Table 8.  Balance sample:  Sources of financing of growth of total assets, 1992-1996 
 
Unweighted averages are the average of the sum (over companies) of each source of finance 
in each year divided by the sum of the growth of total assets.  The balanced samples for the 
four countries are as follows:  India = 115; Malaysia = 130; Thailand = 98; Korea = 95. 
 
Korea*       India  Malaysia Thailand 
Retentions   23.1  25.3  13.3   5.7 
External finance   76.9  74.7  86.7  94.3 
Shares    31.2  14.6   9.6  16.1 
Debt finance   43.3  51.0  70.8  80.6 
Sources of Financing of Growth of Total Assets, 1992-1996 
(unweighted average)
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*Unweighted ratios for Korea are calculated over three years 1994-1996.  Some unusually 
large ratios for 1993 were omitted from overall average. Source:  WorldScope database.
India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Net asset growth 37.2 32.9 39.7 20.6
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 64.9 46.8 55.6 96.5
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 24.0 18.2 15.9 21.1
Other 0.3 14.2 3.6 7.6
Statistical adjustment -1.9 -3.8 -3.5 -10.2
finance were constrained to those between -100 per cent and +200 per cent (see Singh 1995, TP2).  Internal
and external finance were calculated as in Singh (1995), TP2, page 39.  Note also that external finance of net
assets by equity (new shares) was calculated directly as against the residual used in TP2.  
The statistical adjustments in the table arise from the constraints placed on the financial ratios.
India (%) Malaysia (%) Thailand (%) Korea (%)
Retentions 36.9 56.9 48.0 13.7
External finance 63.1 43.1 52.0 86.3
Long term debt 40.6 14.4 36.1 67.8
Shares 22.5 28.6 15.9 18.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  This table was constructed using Singh (1995), TP2 residual method. Retentions and long-term debt were
 calculated directly and new shares werethe residual sources of funds.  Source:  Worldscope database.
Table 9b: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Table 9a: Balanced sample: Unweighted average sources of financing of growth of net assets: 1992-1996
The balance samples for the four countries are: India = 115, Malaysia = 130, Thailand = 98, Korea = 95
Note: All cases where average annual rates of growth of net assets was less than one percent were rejected 
since low values of growth (the denominator) would lead to high values for the whole ratio.  Internal and external
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Specifically, the WorldScope dataset makes it possible to measure the extent of 
equity financing directly instead of using the indirect residual method employed 
in the S-H studies because of data limitations.  The new dataset also allows us to 
undertake a more comprehensive analysis of sources of financing for corporate 
growth including both short- and long-term debt and working capital.  The S-H 
studies only examined long-term debt which in the case of developing countries, 
as subsequent events demonstrated, is not an adequate reflection of their normal 
indebtedness. This is because developing country corporations use large 
amounts of short-term debt for long-term investment purposes. Such debt is 
normally rolled over, turning it into the functional equivalent of long-term debt, 
but creditors may refuse to roll over these debts in crisis situations, as 
exemplified by the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  Therefore, the results reported in 
Table 8 are based on a methodology that differs from that of S-H in the 
following respects: 
 
(a) By measuring the contributing of equity finance directly (as noted above, the 
WorldScope data provides that information); 
(b) By including short-term debt as well as trade credit in external sources of 
finance. The earlier studies were only concerned with long-term capital 
employed in the firm i.e. the growth of net assets.  The exercise in Table 8 
includes all sources of finance -–short term as well as long term. 
(c) By including another category for revaluation reserves, minority interests, 
preferred shares and non-equity reserves. 
 
The results in Table 8 confirm the main S-H result that developing country 
firms depend overwhelming on external finance to finance their growth.  As 
expected, the contribution of external financing is, if anything, greater than in 
the S-H studies because of the inclusion of short-term debt and working capital 
in the sources of finance.  In Korea, for example, nearly 95 per cent of the total 
sources of finance consisted of external finance; in Thailand the corresponding 
figure was 89 per cent; in Malaysia and India, it was 75 and 80 per cent 
respectively.  The contribution of short-term debt to total sources of finance is 
also striking, ranging as it does from just under 30 per cent in India to well over 
45 per cent in Korea. 
 
However, the results for the equity financing variables are more mixed.  
Although only a rough comparison can be made, the results show reduced 
equity financing in some countries in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, and 
increasing equity financing in others.  In the case of India, there is a ten 
percentage point increase in the contribution of new share issues to total sources 
of finance between the 1980s and 1990s. In Malaysia and Korea the proportions 
contributed by new share issues is smaller than in the S-H studies.  
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Nevertheless, in both countries, the contributions of new share capital is more 
than 15 per cent which, contrary to the pecking order theory is greater than the 
share of retained profits (it is of course well above the figure attributed to new 
share issues in advanced economies (Mayer, 1990; Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1994). 
 
The question remains whether the above results can be attributed entirely to the 
biased measurement of the equity financing variable in the benchmark S-H 
studies for the 1980s.  To investigate this, both the Singh and Hamid residual 
method and the direct method were used to calculate the financing of net assets 
(i.e., the long-term capital employed in the firm) in a sample of four countries 
over the 1992-1996 period.  The results reported in Tables 9a and 9b show that 
the direct method and the S-H residual method produce broadly similar results.  
For both India and Korea, the residual method slightly underestimated the 
contribution of equity finance while in the case of Malaysia it significantly 
overestimated its contribution.  In the case of Thailand, both methods arrived at 
identical results.  This analysis therefore suggests that in three out of four 
countries, the S-H method did not overstate the contribution of equity finance.  
Thus, in the case of these countries, the observed changes in the corporate 
financing patterns from the 1980s to the 1990s are likely to reflect the 
substantive factors discussed earlier rather than measurement bias.  
 
It is useful to discuss the Indian example where we observed a modest increase 
in equity financing in the 1990s compared to the benchmark figure in Table 8.  
The early 1990s saw the acceleration of the liberalisation reforms, both financial 
and non-financial, in the wake of the balance of payments crisis of 1991.  A 
subsequent stock market boom resulted in increasing price/earnings ratios and 
consequently a lower cost of equity finance relative to debt (as interest rates 
rose modestly during the period).  More companies went to the stock market for 
finance, with 700 companies making IPOs in 1995-1996.  By 1999, which is of 
course well beyond the period of the WorldScope data examined in this study, 
IPOs had declined to almost zero as the stock market declined and 
price/earnings ratios fell.  
 
Corporate finance, the stock market and corporate governance 
In view of the large recourse to equity financing by developing country firms, it 
would appear that the stock markets might be expected to significantly affect 
their behaviour and their corporate governance patterns. It is therefore important 
to ask how this pattern of corporate finance affects corporate governance. The 
stock market can affect corporate governance and behaviour either directly 
through movements in share prices, or, more indirectly, through the market for 
corporate control.  We examine each of these in turn below.  
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It is clear from the pattern of finance that stock markets may be expected to 
have a significant influence on large developing country corporations because 
of the scale of finance they obtain from these markets. Whether or not this is 
positive or negative development depends to a large extent on the position one 
takes with regard to the ability of the stock market to efficiently finance 
corporations.  In traditional textbook treatments of the subject, the liquid 
secondary equity market results in a better allocation of funds that results in 
more efficient and dynamic firms obtaining capital at lower cost.  Similarly, less 
efficient firms or firms in less dynamic industries face a higher cost of equity 
capital.  The result is the movement of funds to more efficient, productive firms 
that results in higher degrees of technological progress and economic growth.  
 
However, a more critical literature originating in the work of John Maynard 
Keynes has pointed out that the pricing process may not be as efficient as the 
textbooks suggest, but may instead be dominated by speculation.  James Tobin 
has distinguished two concepts of share price efficiency on the stock market: 
informational efficiency (in the sense that all currently available information is 
incorporated into the share price) and fundamental valuation efficiency (share 
prices must accurately reflect the future discounted earnings of the corporation).  
While real world stock market prices may reflect the former, the critical school 
maintains that there are strong reasons to doubt that it attains the latter, more 
important, criterion of efficiency. The reasons for this are found in the 
psychology of stock market participants.7  As Keynes pointed out in his famous 
description of the beauty contest in the General Theory, often the art of the 
successful investor does not consist in appreciating fundamental values of 
corporations, but rather in guessing at the likely movements of other stock 
market participants.  Such a process leads to herding, myopia and fads that can 
lead stock market values to diverge significantly from underlying values (for a 
current example, note the rise and fall of technology shares on international 
stock markets). The volatility associated with this process further reduces the 
capacity of share prices to transmit efficient signals to market participants.   
 
Experience from advanced countries suggests that the stock market may also 
encourage managers to pursue short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
investment since firms are obliged to meet quarterly or half-yearly earnings per 
share targets determined by market expectations. Any serious fall in 
performance will quickly be reflected in a lower share price making the firm 
vulnerable to takeover.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous analysts in 
the United States ascribed that country’s relatively poor comparative 
performance vis-à-vis competitors with bank-based financial systems such as 
Japan and Germany to the short-termist demands of Wall Street resulting in 
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lower investment in technological upgrading and new capacity.8  In a closely 
related but more general sense, the dominance of stock markets can also result 
in the ascendancy of finance over productive enterprise.  The rules of the game 
are constructed in such a way that companies can rise or fall depending on their 
ability to engage in financial engineering rather than in developing new 
products or processes. This is often reflected within the firm itself in the 
dominance of managers trained in finance over those who come from other 
backgrounds such as engineering or marketing.   
 
Thus, the benefits of having large corporations dependent on a highly liquid 
equity market are far from being unambiguous, particularly from the perspective 
of good corporate governance (see further Bhide, 1994). 
 
Corporate governance and takeovers 
The market for corporate control is thought to be the evolutionary endpoint of 
stock market development.  The ability of an outside group of investors to 
acquire a corporation, often through a hostile bid, is the hallmark of the stock 
market dominated US and U.K. financial systems. As noted above, the textbook 
interpretation of takeovers is that they improve efficiency by transferring 
corporate assets to those who can manage them more productively.  
Consequently, more effective managers emerge who can raise the firm’s 
profitability and share price.  Even if current managers are not replaced, an 
active market for corporate control presents a credible threat that inefficient 
managers will be replaced and thus ensures that the incumbent management 
actively seeks to maximize shareholder value and thereby raises corporate 
performance.  Even if quoted firms were not directly susceptible to changes in 
share prices because they finance themselves almost exclusively from internal 
finance (as the pecking order theory implies and empirical evidence on 
developed country corporations confirms), the market for corporate control can 
still discipline managers.  Furthermore, even if all firms are on the efficiency 
frontier, the amalgamation of some through the act of takeovers may lead to a 
better social allocation of resources via synergy.  
 
However, a critical school has developed a multifaceted critique that has 
increasingly questioned the above textbook version of the market for corporate 
control.  First, a number of analysts in the critical school have pointed out that 
in the real world the market for corporate control, even in advanced economies, 
has an inherent flaw in its operation: it is far easier for a large firm to take over 
a small one than the other way around (Singh, 1971, 1975, 1992).  In principle, 
it is possible that a small efficient firm may take over a larger and less efficient 
company (and to a degree this occurred in the US takeover wave of the 1980s 
through “junk bonds”), its incidence is very small (Hughes, 1989).      
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This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India 
where there are large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995).  
These could take over smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce potential 
competition to the detriment of the real economy.  In a takeover battle it is the 
absolute firepower (absolute size) that counts rather than the relative efficiency.  
Therefore, the development of an active market for corporate control may 
encourage managers to “empire-build” not only to increase their monopoly 
power but also to progressively shield themselves from takeover by becoming 
larger (see further Singh, 1975, 1992). 
 
Secondly, the efficient operation of the takeover mechanism requires that 
enormous amounts of information are widely available.  Specifically, market 
participants require information on the profitability of corporations under their 
existing management and what its prospective profitability would be under an 
alternative management if it were taken over.  It has been noted that such 
information is not easily available even in advanced countries and this 
informational deficit is likely to be greater in developing countries.   
 
Thirdly, takeovers are a very expensive way of changing management (Peacock 
and Bannock, 1991).  There are huge transactions costs associated with 
takeovers in countries like the US and UK which hinder the efficiency of the 
takeover mechanism.  Given the lower income levels in the developing 
countries, these costs are likely to be proportionally heavier in these countries.  
It should also be borne in mind that highly successful countries such as Japan, 
Germany and France have not had an active market for corporate control and 
have thus avoided these costs, while still maintaining systems for disciplining 
managers.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that corporate governance 
necessarily improves after takeovers.  This is for the simple reason that all 
takeovers are not disciplinary; in many of them the acquiring firm is motivated 
by empire-building considerations or even by asset-stripping..   
 
Fourthly, there is theoretical work (see for example Stein, 1989) which suggests 
that even if managers wish to maximise shareholder wealth, it would pay them 
to be myopic in a world of takeovers and signal-jamming.  Thus, takeovers 
could exacerbate the already present tendencies towards short-termism in a 
stock market-based system. 
 
Fifthly, it has been argued that takeovers can be used as a device to avoid 
honouring implicit contracts developed between workers and the former 
management (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  This abandonment of implicit 
contracts can be argued to be socially harmful in that it discourages the 
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accumulation of firm-specific human capital by workers.  The absence of strong 
worker-protection laws in many developing countries means that such 
considerations may be significant. 
 
These critiques of the market for corporate control have been based on the 
experience of advanced countries.  There is every reason to believe, however, 
that they are likely to be even more relevant to potential takeover markets in 
developing countries.  However, the takeover market in developing countries 
remains rudimentary because of the fact, noted earlier, that shareholding is not 
widely dispersed and standards of disclosure are not conducive to takeovers.  It 
is therefore not surprising that hostile takeovers are rare in developing 
countries: e.g. in the last decade in India there have only been five or six such 
takeover attempts, not all of which were successful.  However, this situation 
may change if large international MNCs are allowed to engage in takeovers in 
developing countries.  Domestic firms, with their limited funds and relatively 
restricted access to international capital markets, would not be able to either 
compete or resist the MNCs.  In addition, as we will discuss later, the entry of 
large MNCs in the takeover market may reduce competition in product markets 
in these countries. 
 
There are also other potential factors that could lead financial liberalisation and 
stock markets to have a negative effect on corporate governance.  Financial 
liberalisation establishes a strong link between two potentially volatile markets, 
the stock market and the foreign exchange market.  The Asian crisis of 1997-
1998 demonstrated that there could be a strong negative feedback relationship 
between a falling stock market and a depreciating currency.  As the stock 
market declines, investors pull out of the market and move their funds into 
foreign currency.  The depreciating currency, in turn, lowers real returns on the 
stock market which in turn propels the cycle.9  Such a collapse in currency and 
equity values of course, ultimately may encourage “fire-sale-type FDI” in the 
form of takeovers, (suggesting that the expected rate of return measured in 
foreign currency has increased sufficiently due to the steep decline in domestic 
share prices).  This may overturn quite successful corporate governance 
structures and replace them with ones that are less suited.        
 
Developing Country Corporations and High Gearing 
It has been frequently observed that companies in developing countries are 
highly geared by international standards.  This observation is dependent on what 
definition of gearing is used.  If the ratio of long-term debt to equity is used, 
developing country indebtedness ratios are not high.  However, if the more 
encompassing ratio of total debt to total equity is used, the gearing of 
developing country corporations is high (see Table 10).  This reflects the 
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extensive use of more easily available short-term debt by many developing 
country corporations to finance their often rapid growth.  In the wake of the 
Asian crisis and the evidence that the large amount of short-term debt 
contracted by conglomerates - particularly in Korea, but also in the other 
affected economies - had increased the vulnerability of these countries to a 
reversal of capital flows, the international financial institutions and governments 
have been calling for a reduction in gearing ratios.  It should be remembered, 
however, that it is possible, a priori, to use high gearing ratios to improve 
performance (by creating an optimal contract that bridges the agency problem 
between owners and managers) and also serves to enable the creation of 
conglomerates in the first place.  This is important since, as will be discussed in 
the next section, large conglomerates are instrumentally effective in late 
developing countries.   
 
Table 10.  Capital Structure of Firms in Selected Countries, 1980-1991
Debt Ratio Long-term debt to total 
equity
Short-term debt to total 
equity
Developing Countries
Brazil 0.560 0.139 0.421
India 2.700 0.763 1.937
Korea 3.662 1.057 2.390
Malaysia 0.935 0.284 0.639
Mexico 0.817 0.375 0.442
Thailand 2.215 0.518 1.769
Developed Countries
France 3.613 1.417 2.108
Germany 2.732 1.479 1.188
Italy 3.068 1.114 1.954
Japan 3.688 0.938 2.726
United Kingdom 1.480 1.065 1.065
United States 1.791 1.054 0.679
Source: Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic. 1996. "Stock Market
Development and Firm Financing Choices", The World Bank Economic 
Review, vol.10. no.2, p.354.
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The key question at the heart of this issue is what defines the optimal degree of 
gearing.  In theoretical terms this is not difficult – the optimal gearing ratio is 
the one that maximises shareholder value.  Empirically, however, this is very 
difficult to determine. 
 
It has also been argued that high gearing ratios are only possible because the 
conglomerates themselves are considered by the state as “too big too fail” and 
so do not have to bear the cost of financial distress.  However, this overlooks 
the mechanism by which discipline was instilled in the system.  A failing 
conglomerate in Korea was not simply dissolved through the market (which 
might not place a value on the firm) but was rather taken over by another 
conglomerate. The conglomerate thus ceased to have an independent existence 
and the managers who ran it were dismissed. Again, in markets which are 
incomplete such a mechanism is efficient and reduces the losses associated with 
completely dissolving the conglomerate.  These countries have maintained high 
growth rates despite such supposedly “inefficient” practices.  In the wake of the 
Asian crisis there has been a chorus of calls for the establishment of an effective 
bankruptcy code in these countries.  Given that capital account liberalisation has 
increased the presence of foreign banks and investors in Asian corporations, 
such a development is probably necessary. However, it does not answer the 
important question of which bankruptcy code to establish. Bankruptcy codes are 
very different throughout the OECD and developing countries will have to 
examine them closely to see which one is most effective in their individual 
circumstances. 
 
However, high gearing ratios entail both benefits and costs for the firm.  High 
ratios can help alleviate the agency problem that exists between owners and 
managers by compelling the latter to work harder to improve profitability and 
productivity.  Furthermore, high gearing ratios also allow families that are 
reluctant to issue new equity to retain control of companies. Under normal 
circumstances, high gearing ratios do not present many problems since short-
term debt is almost rolled over, making it the functional equivalent of long-term 
debt.  However, as the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 demonstrated, high levels of 
debt can also be a source of vulnerability, especially if it has a short maturity 
structure and is denominated in foreign currency.  In principle, this problem 
should be attenuated if the debt is contracted in local currency because the 
central bank can expand the money supply to reduce the real financing burden 
of the corporate sector.    
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VII.  Conglomerates and Economic Efficiency 
 
Another issue closely connected with corporate governance and corporate 
finance in emerging markets is that of large family-owned conglomerates – an 
organisational form which is ubiquitous in the developing world.  These have 
been blamed for the Asian crisis because of their lack of transparency, poor 
corporate governance, and inadequate accounting procedures and for not being 
focused.  The owners are thought to be more interested in empire building than 
in pursuing share-holder value.  It is also suggested that the giant third world 
conglomerates, or the business groups, are regarded by the governments as 
being ‘too big to fail’, leading to moral hazard. The high gearing ratios of 
developing country conglomerates, such as those in Korea, are thought to reflect 
the cronyistic relationship between corporations, banks and the government. 
The business groups often have an in-house banks which it is alleged are used 
by the controlling families to undertake risky debt financed projects, or to create 
over-capacity.   
 
This is however a partial, one-sided picture of Business Groups in developing 
countries that ignores the most recent theoretical and empirical research on the 
subject.  It also overlooks the salient point that such firms have been playing the 
leading role in emerging markets in all continents notwithstanding the 
differences in institutional structures, cultures and government economic 
policies. Economic policy towards developing country conglomerates needs to 
be based on a full comprehension of their specificity rather than simply 
applying the lessons of diversified firms in the U.K. and the US.   
 
The other side of the story is prFovided by Amsden (1989 and 2000), in a series 
of papers by Khanna and Palepu (notably 1997, 1999), and Khanna and Yafeh 
(2000) as well as the earlier work of other scholars (see for example Leff, 1978, 
1979).  These scholars point out important differences between the third world 
conglomerates and their western counterparts.  The latter, particularly in the US, 
were products of the huge takeover movements of the 1960s.  At that time, the 
Anglo-Saxon stock markets convinced themselves that conglomerates added 
value: they became the glamour stocks of the period.  However, the subsequent 
lacklustre performance of conglomerate firms led by the mid-1980s to stock 
market opinion moving decisively against these diversified firms. The same 
market professionals and investment banks who made money on assembling 
these conglomerates in the 1960s through the takeover process now profited 
from dissembling these through the same process – what Scherer (1988) called 
the “bustup” takeovers.  Ignoring the social cost of these obvious mistakes of 
the stock markets,10 the significant point is that developing country 
conglomerates are a different breed: they are normally not products of takeovers 
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but in fact have usually grown and diversified organically.  Many of them are, 
however, engaged in such a wide variety of products and industries, with no 
apparent technological connections between them, that they have been rightly 
called idiosyncratic conglomerates.11  Historically, there were diversified firms 
in today’s advanced countries as well during the course of their economic 
development.  However, this diversification was usually limited to the 
technologically closely related industries (Chandler, 1977, and Amsden and 
Hikino,1994).  The emerging market conglomerates are diversified far beyond 
such technological linkages. 
 
Alice Amsden (1989, 2000) regards Korean chaebols as the engines of Korea’s 
industrial development and of its enormous success in international markets.  
Khanna and Palepu in their papers cited earlier provide the theoretical rationale 
as to why these big business groups maybe more successful in emerging 
markets than in developed countries. Their argument is straightforward. 
Developing countries suffer from a large number of market deficiencies. They 
have incomplete or missing product markets, as well as those for labour and 
capital, far more so than would be the case in advanced countries.  In addition, 
emerging markets do not yet have the whole gamut of information gathering 
and disseminating private organisations, regulatory institutions, professional 
bodies, all of which constitute the economic, social and legal institutional 
framework within which advanced country markets are embedded. In the 
absence of such a framework in emerging markets, conglomerate firms help fill 
this institutional void. To illustrate, in the absence of trained managers and 
training institutions for such managers, Business Groups would often have in-
house training centres for the Group managers. Tata, for example, in India has a 
world class training program for all their Group managers. Similarly, in view of 
the many imperfections of developing country capital markets, it is more 
efficient for the Business Group central office to allocate capital directly 
through an appropriate internal allocative mechanism. Williamson (1975) is the 
classic reference on this subject. 
 
In relation to international trade, developing country corporations are at a 
serious competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis those from advanced countries. The 
latter have well-established brand names, huge advertising budgets which 
constitute enormous barriers to entry for developing country firms.  The 
Business Group gives these firms an institutional means of at least partially 
overcoming this handicap. Instead of promoting brand names for particular 
products as advanced countries corporations do, those in emerging markets 
attempt to build the image and reputation for high quality of the Business Group 
as a whole. Thus, the Samsung and Hyundai groups are promoted -  rather than 
single product lines - as a strategic response to the market disadvantages which 
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individual or unaffiliated developing country firms face. This has arguably been 
a major factor in the success of large Korean conglomerates in the international 
market place. The result is that by 1990, 11 Korean firms were represented in 
the Fortune magazine ranking of the world’s top five hundred corporations, the 
same number as Switzerland.  Twenty years earlier, there was not a single 
Korean company in the top five hundred.12
 
Amsden and Hikino (1994) put forward a different kind of argument to explain 
the existence and the efficiency of privately owned Business Groups in late 
industrialising countries. They suggest that in these countries Business Group 
managers become adept at choosing, purchasing and adapting relevant 
technologies from abroad. This kind of expertise Amsden and Hikino suggest is 
not industry specific and can be used in many different industries. Support for 
this hypothesis is provided by the Management Agency System, which 
prevailed in India for almost a hundred years. Under this system, teams 
specialising in modern management would offer to run firms on modern lines in 
different industries for a management fee.  The system was ultimately abolished 
in India after independence, not on grounds of inefficiency, but rather on 
grounds of equity – the system was held to promote monopoly power and was at 
variance with India’s “socialistic” pattern of development.  Many of the leading 
present day Indian Business Groups are direct descendants of the Management 
Agency System. 
 
There are thus powerful analytical arguments for the existence, survival and 
efficiency of Business groups in developing countries. In the absence of 
appropriate institution and markets which have taken a long time to develop, the 
dominant Anglo-Saxon strategies of “core competence” and “focus” are 
unlikely to be suitable for Business Groups in emerging markets. 
 
Empirical evidence 
Turning now to empirical evidence, how do developing country Business 
Groups perform relative to unaffiliated firms? Are they so idiosyncratically 
diversified that despite the reasons outlined above they are nevertheless 
inefficient and need to be down-sized or abolished altogether?  Some empirical 
research on this issue is summarised in Table 11.  The table comes from Khanna 
and Yafeh’s (2000) careful and painstaking study of Business Groups from 15 
emerging markets. As the definition of what constitutes a Business Group 
differs between countries in this research it is defined on the basis of local 
expert knowledge in each country.13  The table pertains to various periods in the 
1980s and 1990s.  It indicates that in 9 out of 15 emerging markets, the average 
rate of return of the group-affiliated firms was greater than that of the 
unaffiliated firms.  In 8 out of 15 emerging markets, the average standard 
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deviation of the rate of return of the affiliated groups is smaller than that of their 
unaffiliated counterparts.  Nevertheless, only a few of the differences are 
statistically significant.  Khanna and Yafeh (2000) conclude from this evidence 
that the “provision of risk sharing, to compensate for under-developed capital 
markets, is probably not the most important reason for the ubiquity of business 
groups around the world.”  
 
Khanna (2000) provides a review of the empirical studies on the efficiency of 
Business Groups.  He concludes:  
 
…the existing evidence suggests that the performance effects of group 
affiliation are large and generally positive.  There is substantial evidence 
that part of this is due to welfare-enhancing functions originating in the 
idea that groups substitute for missing outside institutions, but that part is 
also due to welfare-reducing minority shareholder exploitation.  (p.748) 
 
The last clause in Khanna’s conclusion suggests that there are also negative 
effects of Business Groups.  Specifically, the Groups are known to exploit the 
minority shareholders in the Group companies (see further Claessens et al., 
1999 and Johnson et al., 1999).  However, notwithstanding anecdotal evidence 
about rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour of Business Groups, there is 
very little systematic empirical evidence on this subject.   
 
Policy Issues: The Chaebol Reform in Korea 
The most important and immediate policy issues with respect to the Business 
Groups in emerging markets arise in relation to the chaebol conglomerates in 
Korea. Chaebol reform constituted an important element in the IMF 
conditionality for Korea following the financial crisis on 1997-98.  Reforms 
involved improvements in corporate governance, greater focus, reducing the 
level of diversification and reductions in the debt/equity ratio.  This was 
envisaged to be a part of the structural reform of the corporate sector from close 
relationships between the government, business and the banks to an arm’s 
length relationship between the three entities.  After initial hesitation, the new 
Kim Dae Jung government evidently supported these reforms (Krause, 2000).   
 
The most serious criticism of the chaebol was that they had invested recklessly 
in unprofitable projects on borrowed money. It is indeed true that the top 
chaebol had, at the time of the crisis, high debt/equity ratios (see Table 12).  
The top five chaebols had an average debt/equity ratio of 458% in 1997.  Under 
the government’s reorganisation plan, imposed on the chaebol, they were 
supposed to reduce these ratios to 200% by the end of 1999.  
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Country Year No. of firms No.of group 
affiliated firms
(Median size of 
group affiliated 
firms)/(Median 
size of un-
affiliated firms)
Median of ROA 
of group 
affliated firms 
(%)
Median of ROA 
of unaffliated 
firms (%)
Median stadard 
deviation of 
ROA, group 
affiliated firms 
(%)
Median stadard 
deviation of 
ROA,  
unaffiliated 
firms (%)
Argentina 90-97 25 11 5.53 3.95 7.78** 3.67 4.91**
Brazil 90-97 108 51 2.50 3.3 1.85** 4.05 5.07
Chile 89-96 225 50 18.71 5.93 2.2* 4.42 4.10
Colobia 88-97 16 7 4.54 1.43 0.90 7.40 9.02
India 90-97 5446 1821 4.37 11.73 9.56* 4.65 4.37*
Indonesia 93-95 236 153 2.79 7.31 7.81 1.93 2.53*
Israel 93-95 183 43 4.99 5.6 3.90 4.40 6.80
Korea 91-95 427 218 3.63 4.85 5.12 1.88 2.58*
Mexico 88-97 55 19 2.29 8.22 6.08 4.89 4.92
Peru 88-97 21 5 1.62 7.92 7.86 10.51 9.98
Philippines 92-97 148 37 3.43 7.32 3.98 2.48 2.95
Taiwan 90-97 178 79 2.05 5.07 6.22 1.75 2.26**
Thailand 92-97 415 258 2.33 2.9 4.41* 4.32 4.93**
Turkey 88-97 40 21 0.96 24.62 26.32 12.52 12.37
Venezuela 88-97 11 2 1.45 3.68 4.60 6.11 3.9*
Pre-war Japan 32-43 58 17 6.80 5.5 6.40 4.40 7.10
Post-war Japan 77-92 1002 94 8.50 3.41 3.63 2.23 2.29
Firm numbers, as well as statistics on firm size (total assets) and median return on ssets (ROA) are all based on the year for which we have maximal coverage 
for the country in question.  Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below -100 percent are excluded from the analysis.  In pre-was Japan
group affliation refers to affliation in the largest three zaibatzu only.  In post-war Japan, group members are defined as members of Presidents' Club only.  
Significance levels for the comparisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. * denotes significance at 5 percent level and **denotes 
significance at 10 percent level.
Table 11. Group affilication around the world
Note: The table shows summary statistics on group risk and operating performance for fifteen emerging markets as well as for pre-and post-was Japan.  
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Table 12.  Debt-equity ratios of Korean Chaebols (million won)
Company Total Assets Debt Debt/equity ratio 
Samsung 50856.4 37043.6 268.2
Hyundai 53183.7 43319.3 439.1
Daewoo 34205.6 26383.2 337.3
Lucky-Goldstar 37068.4 28765.6 346.5
Hanjin 13904.5 11787.7 556.9
Kia 14161.9 11890.9 523.6
Ssanyong 15807.2 12701.4 409.0
Sunkyong 22726.6 18040.3 385.0
Hanwha 10967.7 9718.8 778.2
Daelim 5793.3 4586.5 380.1
Kumho 7398.0 6117.9 477.9
Doosan 6402.0 5594.0 692.3
Halla 6626.5 6320.8 2067.6
Sammi 2515.4 2593.3 3329.0
Hyosung 4124.4 3252.8 373.2
Hanil 2628.1 2231.8 563.2
Dong-Ah Construction 6287.9 4905.8 355.0
Kohap 3653.6 3123.6 589.4
Jinro 3940.5 3865.2 8598.7
Dongkuk Steel 3697.5 2536.4 218.4
Source: Finance Times, August 8, 1997 reproduced in Singh 1998.
 
It will be appreciated in the light of the theoretical and empirical discussions 
above that the case for such reforms on grounds of economic efficiency are 
rather thin.  As Khanna and Palepu (1999) note, abolishing or restricting the 
chaebol may be inefficient in the absence of a range of market institutions that 
will take time to develop.  There is also no reason to believe that the optimal 
debt/equity ratio for the top five chaebols is necessarily 200%, rather than any 
other arbitrary number.   Other countries with different financial systems than 
those of the U.K. and the US also have high debt/equity ratios, for example, 
Norway (500-538%), Sweden (555%) and Finland (492%).  In Japan the 
debt/equity ratio in 1991 was measured at 369%, while in France and Italy it 
measured 361% and 307% respectively.  Moreover, there is reason to believe 
that the debt/equity ratios of US corporations are rising as they are buying up 
their own equity by borrowing money (Economist, Jan.22-Feb.2, 2001, Survey 
of Corporate Finance). 
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However, as Singh (1998c) notes, the more significant point in relation to the 
high debt/equity ratios of Korean chaebol is that these corporate financial 
arrangements were functional within the traditional Korean system.  These 
arrangements were particularly useful during Korea’s industrialisation drive, as 
the corporations were induced by the government to enter into new 
technological area involving huge risks.  Left to themselves, the corporations 
may not have been able to undertake such risks, but with the government 
becoming in effect a co-partner through the banking system, such technological 
risks were effectively “socialised”.  However, this system became dysfunctional 
when the government introduced financial liberalisation and abolished 
economic planning in the early 1990s in preparation for its membership in the 
OECD.  By permitting Korean companies and banks to raise money abroad 
without the traditional supervision and control, the authorities were unable to 
control – or even monitor – the rapid accumulation of short-term, foreign 
currency denominated debt.  In this connection, it is interesting to note the case 
of India, since Business Groups there are also highly geared.  However, despite 
the fact that the country’s fundamentals were, if anything, weaker than those in 
Korea, a crisis did not develop because the government maintained strict 
controls on the foreign-currency exposure of the private sector.  Thus, India’s 
limited and deliberate move towards capital account convertibility has lessened 
the vulnerability of the rupee to sudden shifts in investor sentiment and to 
speculative attacks.             
 
The empirical evidence in support of the popular view that Business Groups in 
developing countries must be drastically reformed or even abolished is 
strikingly thin.  However, there remains theoretical and empirical support for 
the view that large Business Groups play a key role in late industrialisation by 
compensating for structural gaps in developing country capital, product and 
labour markets.  Given the paucity of evidence and studies in this area, it is 
appropriate to adopt a more cautious stance with regard to these groups than the 
current orthodox policy consensus allows.  As Khanna (2000) notes in the 
conclusion to his study: “What seems clear is that an extreme characterization 
of groups as purely socially harmful or purely socially welfare enhancing 
appears unsupported by the evidence (p.756).”   
 
It is also pertinent to point out that the charge that Business Groups are large 
bureaucratic organisations that thwart innovation and small firm entry is not 
supported by analysis and evidence.  On the contrary, Khanna and Palepu 
(1999) note that in the absence of specialised venture capital firms, the Business 
Groups in emerging markets help fill this institutional gap.  Evidence from India 
– a successful IT country – suggests that the top 25 Indian exports and 
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producers of IT were mostly off-shoots of big Business Groups (Singh, Singh 
and Weisse, 2000). 
    
Finally, in relation to corporate governance, the IMF view is to restructure the 
chaebol towards maximizing shareholder value, giving greater power to 
minority shareholders, increasing the representation of non-executive directors 
on the board – in other words, to look more like Anglo-Saxon firms.  However, 
Singh (1998, 1999) and Chang and Park (1999) have argued that this is not the 
most desirable reform agenda, let alone the only possible one.  An alternative 
reform strategy is proposed by Singh (1999) which envisages building on the 
close relationship between government, business and finance. It is suggested 
that in order to overcome the crisis, these relationships need to be strengthened 
further rather than being abandoned. One way to do this would be to extend the 
government-business relationship to other social sectors, particularly labour and 
civil society. Such co-operative relationships with respect to the governance of 
corporations and the society at large are more likely to help in the current crisis 
than arm’s length relationships between government, business and labour.  The 
latter types of structure have a tendency to degenerate into adversarial relations 
during times of crisis that can make the desired changes more difficult to 
achieve. 
 
VIII. Competition and Corporate Governance: Theoretical Issues 
 
Milton Friedman long ago argued that if there was perfect competition in 
product markets economists would not have had to worry about problems of 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations or about the 
associated problem of corporate governance.  Natural selection in a competitive 
market would ensure that only the profit maximisers – and by implication, only 
the optimal ownership patterns and corporate governance structures – would 
survive. However, as Winters (1964) subsequently showed rigorously, if 
competition was imperfect, different corporate governance systems could co-
exist.   
 
The debate than moved to the capital market.  In seminal contributions Alchian 
and Kessel (1962) and Manne (1965) argued that even if there was imperfect 
competition in the product markets, firms would still be forced to maximize 
profit and to adopt the optimal governance structures. Otherwise they would be 
subject to takeover from those who would be willing to maximise monopoly 
profits. The validity of this assertion depends on the existence of a perfect 
capital market including a market for corporate control.  In the event, although 
there have been huge merger waves during the last century or more (specifically 
during the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s) in the Anglo-Saxon economies, these have 
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not fulfilled the requirement of a perfect market for corporate control.  As noted 
earlier in Section VI, this market suffers from fundamental imperfections: it is 
much easier for a large and profitable firm to take over a small profitable firm 
than the other way around.  This hypothesis is confirmed by empirical evidence 
which suggests that. in the real world, the probability of survival for a large 
unprofitable firm are significantly higher than those for a smaller, relatively 
profitable firm. 
   
In the light of these difficulties with the market for corporate control, the wheel 
has turned full circle.  It is now being suggested that the main constraint on the 
behaviour and governance structure of the large corporations is the intense 
international competition in product markets. Nevertheless, neoclassical 
economists now recognise that in view of the oligopolistic nature of product 
market competition and imperfections in the market for corporate control, there 
does exist a governance problem in the modern corporation: this is modelled in 
the form of a principal-agent problem (Jensen and Meckeling, 1979; Jensen, 
1988).  In this conception, the separation of ownership and control imposes 
agency costs on the corporation.  The magnitude of this cost varies inversely 
with the nature and extent of the competition in the product and capital markets.  
As the relevant aspects of the market for corporate control has already been 
examined, above and in Section VI, we turn now to a discussion of the nature 
and extent of competition including international competition in emerging 
markets.  
 
IX.  Product market competition in emerging markets 
Apart from its significance for the study of corporate governance, it is also 
important to examine the product market competition in emerging markets for 
other more practical reasons. These relate to new developments during the last 
two decades in the international economy as well as those in the domestic 
economies of developing countries.  The implications of these developments for 
the competitive behaviour of firms and for the intensity of competition in 
emerging markets will be discussed in this sector whilst those for competition 
policy will be taken up in the next discussion. 
 
1. Initiated by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. during the 
1980s, there has been a worldwide trend toward privatisation of state 
industry and deregulation.  These privatised firms in many of the emerging 
markets often involve natural monopolies.  It is therefore important to find 
out how competition and competitive behaviour has changed as a result of 
privatisation of former state owned monopolies and other publicly owned 
enterprises.  
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2. The international economy under globalisation and liberalisation has been 
subject to a gigantic international merger wave during the last decade.  There 
have been large merger waves before in advanced countries which have 
occurred simultaneously in several countries (e.g., the merger wave of the late 
1960s) but these have generally not involved any significant amount of cross-
border takeovers.  However, the current merger wave in the US and U.K. (the 
two countries with the best historical statistics on this subject) is not only likely 
to be the largest ever recorded in terms of the total value of the corporations' 
GDP, but it will also have, for the first time, a large cross-border component.  
 
The cross-border M&A activity has mainly involved corporations in advanced 
countries.  Nevertheless, there has been considerable M&A activity in emerging 
markets as well (see Tables 13a and 13b).  The activities have mostly involved 
foreign multinationals (the domestic market for corporate control in emerging 
markets is typically very small, if not non-existent).  These takeovers by foreign 
multinationals in emerging markets have direct implications for competitive 
behaviour of firms and hence for competition policy.  As noted earlier, even the 
merger activity in advanced countries has potential consequences for 
competition and competition policy in emerging markets. 
 
Notwithstanding the significance of the subject, there is very little systematic 
information available on the intensity of competition in emerging markets on an 
international comparative basis.  There is anecdotal evidence and conjectures 
about the degree of competition in these countries.  For example, as stated 
earlier, the IMF analysis of the structural reasons for the financial crisis in East 
Asia in 1997-98 suggests that the deeper reasons for the crisis lay, in part, in the 
poor competitive environment in countries such as Korea leading to over-
investment.  On the other hand, Porter (1992) and Amsden and Singh (1994) 
suggest that Korean chaebol display vigorous rivalry in both national and 
international markets.  However, some support for the IMF position is provided 
by Table 14 which gives average concentration ratios for different time periods 
for a small group of emerging markets.  The Table suggests that concentration 
tend to be high in these countries, being sometimes greater than those in 
advanced countries.  However, economists have long recognised that such 
concentration measures based only on properties of the size distribution of firms 
are inadequate for measuring the intensity of competition in an economy.
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Region/economy
1998 1999 1998 1999
Developed countries: 445.1 644.6 511.4 677.3
European Union 187.9 344.5 284.4 497.7
United States 209.5 233.0 137.4 112.4
Japan 4.0 15.9 1.3 9.8
Developing countries 80.7 63.4 19.2 41.2
Africa 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
Latin American and the Caribbean 63.9 37.2 12.6 24.9
Europe 0.3
Asia 16.1 25.3 6.4 15.9
Pacific 0.1
Central and Easter Europe b 5.1 10.3 1.0 1.6
Worldc 531.6 720.1 531.6 720.1
Source: UUNCTAD, FDI/TNC database
Notes:
a: Cross-border M&As that result in the acquisition of more than 10 per cent equity share
b: Includes the countries of the former Yugoslavia
c: Includes amounts which cannot be allocatied by region
Sector/Industry 1990 1995 1998 1999
Primary 15 76 146 47
Secondary 54 457 5087 8125
Tertiary 102 1935 5633 6547
Total 171 2468 10866 14719
Source: UN World Investment Report 2000
most affected by the financial crisisa, by sector, 1990-1999
Table13b.  Sales of cross-border M&As in the five Asian countries 
Table 13a.  Cross-border M&As a : Sales and Purchases, 1998-99 (USD b.)
Sales Purchases
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Table 14. Concentration Ratios in Emerging Economies 
Economy   Three-firm concentration ratios 
   Share 
Japan, 1980    56 
 
Korea, Rep. of, 1981   62 
Taiwan, China, 1981   49 
Four-firm concentration ratios 
___________________________________________________________________________
__ 
Argentina, 1984   43 
Brazil, 1980   51 
Chile, 1979   50 
India, 1984   46 
Indonesia, 1985   56 
Mexico, 1980   48 
Pakistan, 1985   68 
Turkey, 1976   67 
United States, 1972   40 
Source: World Bank 1993 
Recently, however, Glen, Lee and Singh (2000) have addressed the question of 
intensity of competition in emerging markets directly and provided systematic 
comparative evidence on how this varies between emerging markets and also 
between developed and developing countries. The authors use standard 
methodology based on the so-called “persistence of profitability” studies to 
measure intensity of competition. This methodology has been employed in a 
large number of studies to analyse the intensity of competition in advanced 
country product markets.14 The basic intuition here is that if competition was 
intense, firms would tend to display low persistence of profits as any temporary 
advantage which a firm may enjoy (either say because of good management, a 
new money making technique or monopoly power) will soon be competed away 
by rivals. On the other hand, if the competition is not so intense then those with 
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above average profits in one period will continue to have above average profits 
in subsequent periods. 
 
Glen, Lee and Singh have carried out a time series analysis of profitability for 
350 emerging market corporations in seven countries.Their estimated 
persistency coefficients are reported in Table 15. The corresponding coefficients 
for advanced countries which are based on the same methodology are reported 
in Table 16. A comparison of the two tables reveals that, remarkably, the 
persistency coefficients in emerging markets are systematically lower than those 
for advanced countries. This result is quite unexpected as many economists 
would assume a priori that emerging markets will have less intense market 
competition than advanced countries. Laffont (1999), for example, argues that 
developing country markets are likely to be highly imperfect because of their 
small size, lack of transportation and other infrastructural deficits. 
 
 
Table 15. Mean values of λ, YLR and  22
 Mean λ    Mean YLR   Mean 22 
  Brazil 0.013 0.003     0.418 
  India 0.229 0.003    0.282 
  Jordan 0.348 0.05    0.299 
  Korea 0.323 0.005    0.3 
  Malaysia 0.349 0.009    0.302 
  Mexico 0.222 -0.002    0.316 
 Zimbabwe 0.421 0.157    0.249 
Source: Glen, Lee and Singh (2000) 
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Table 16. Persistence of Profitability Studies for Industrial Countries 
 
Author          Country   Sample     Observations    Number    Sample mean 
Period       per firm            of firms      (Lamda [i] ) 
 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) UK 1947-77         29   51  0.488  
    France 1965-82         18  55  0.412  
    Germany1961-81 21  28   0.410 
 
Schwalbach et.al (1989)  Germany1961-8  22  299   0.485 
 
Mueller (1990)                 US 1950-72         23  551   0.183 
 
Cubbin and Geroski (1990) UK 1948-77         30  243   0.482  
Khemani and Shapiro (1990)Canada 1964-82         19  129   0.425 
 
Odagiri and Yamawaki (1990) Japan 1964-82         19  376   0.465 
 
Schohl (1990)   Germany1961-81 21  283   0.509 
 
Waring (1996)c      US 1970-89 20          12,986   0.540 
Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999) 
a. Based on nominal profit on capital, before tax 
b. Estimations are for industry groups. Estimates of lamda are from a range of specifications for 
the persistence model, which differ across industries.   
c. Estimate based on pooled data for 128 industry groups.  The mean lamda has been 
estimated by the present authors from the data in Table 3 of Waring (1996). 
 
 
Glen, Lee and Singh argue that their results may be counterintuitive but they are 
not implausible.  Economists have similar preconceptions about competition in 
Japan which was thought to be less intense than in US manufacturing industry.  
However, systematic empirical research indicated that, in fact, this was not the 
case, it is true that US retailing is more efficient that Japanese retailing but 
wholesale manufacturing goods markets, if anything, display greater intensity of 
competition in Japan than in the US.  More importantly, Glen, Lee and Singh’s 
conclusion on the intensity of competition in emerging markets is fully in 
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accord with evidence presented in a comprehensive review article on the 
efficiency of third world manufacturing industry by Tybout (2000).  He 
observes: 
 The manufacturing sectors of developing countries have traditionally 
been relatively protected.  They have also been subject to heavy 
regulation, much of which is biased in favour of large enterprises.  
Accordingly, it if often argued that manufacturers in these 
countries perform poorly in several respects: (1) firm 
productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched 
oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) 
many small firms are unable or unwilling to grow, so important 
scale economies go unexploited. 
  
It is important to emphasise that the above remarks about the unexpectedly high 
intensity of competition in emerging markets apply only to manufacturing 
industry. 
 
Sectors such as banking and retailing are much less efficient in emerging than in 
advanced country markets. 
Tybout concludes: 
 
 Indeed, although the issue remains open, the existing empirical 
literature does not support the notion that LDC manufacturers are 
relatively stagnant and inefficient.  Turnover rates in plants and 
jobs are at least as high as those found in the OECD and the 
amount if cross-plant dispersion in measured productivity rates is 
not generally greater. Also, although small-scale production is 
relatively common in LDCs, there do not appear to be major 
potential gains from better exploitation of scale economies.  
 
X. Developing countries, WTO and competition policy 
Apart from their effects on the intensity of competition in emerging markets, the 
new national and international developments detailed in the previous section 
also have important implications for competition policy.  For even though we 
have found that product market competition is no less intense in developing 
than in developed countries, this does not obviate the need for a competition 
policy.  The latter is required in developing countries today not least to counter 
the potential anti-competitive impact of mergers and acquisitions by large 
multinationals both within developing countries as well as worldwide. 
 
Many developing countries do not have a competition policy and so far have not 
needed one.  This was mainly because of state control of economic activities 
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and regulation of various markets.  Competition policy was not required 
because many governments had the powers to use direct price controls to 
restrain monopoly power if necessary.  But now, with extensive privatisation, a 
much diminished state sector and deregulation, it is clearly necessary for 
developing countries to have some polices to regulate anti-competitive 
behaviour.  The main question is what kind of competition policy is appropriate 
for these countries?  Should they adopt the same kind of competition laws as 
those implemented in the US or the U.K.?  Or should competition policy of 
developing countries be different from those of advanced countries? 
 
At the WTO advanced countries have been pressing developing countries to 
include competition policy in the WTO agreements in order to ensure ‘fair play’ 
and ‘level playing fields’ between countries. The argument is simple: if one 
country (say) allows mergers freely while another has a competition policy 
prohibiting monopoly creating mergers, there would not be ‘fair’ competition 
between firms in the two countries. This will lead not only to a global 
misallocation of resources but may also not generate fair competition between 
firms in the two countries.15Most advanced countries have a competition policy 
of one kind or another and in their case it is a matter of harmonising such 
policies so that free trade and free capital flows between countries are 
unimpeded.   
 
Developing countries have been opposed to the proposal that competition policy 
should become a part of the WTO disciplines.  Their formal stance has been to 
suggest that a large number of them do not yet have a competition policy 
whereas advanced countries have experience with such policy, some of them for 
the last 100 years. Therefore, they cannot be expected to enter into negotiations 
about a subject they don’t know anything about. The real reason for developing 
country opposition is that they do not wish any new disciplines to be included in 
the WTO agreements because of the provision of cross-sanctions: a violation in 
one area may be penalised in an another by the complaining country (if the 
complaint is held to be justified). Developing countries take the view that the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, that established the WTO, need to be reviewed for 
their impact on developing countries before undertaking a new round of tariff 
cutting or starting negotiations on new subjects such as competition policy and 
the multi-lateral agreement on investment (MAI). 
 
As the subject of MAI has been examined elsewhere,16 we confine ourselves in 
this paper to the question of competition policy. At the Singapore ministerial 
meeting of the WTO in 1996 a compromise was struck whereby it was agreed 
that competition policy would be examined by a study group without prejudice 
to any future negotiations. It was also accepted in the ministerial declaration that 
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the study group would give particular attention to the development dimension of 
competition policy. Accordingly, a study group was duly established at the 
WTO to examine the matter and its term was extended at the Seattle meeting in 
1999. 
 
Notwithstanding the justified misgivings of developing countries with respect to 
any negotiations on the subject at the WTO, it is important for them to acquire 
an understanding of the important issues involved in this area and be prepared 
to offer counter proposals when appropriate. 
 
The question of competition policy in developing countries is being studied not 
only at the WTO but also by a number of other organisations, including 
UNCTAD, the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Consequently, 
there is large and growing literature on the subject but, with a few exceptions, 
much of it is unsatisfactory as it does not take into account the development 
dimension (despite claims to the contrary).  
 
Singh and Dhumale (1999) provide a trenchant critique of the documents 
generated by the WTO study group in relation to the development dimension. 
They argue that in order to give adequate recognition to this aspect of 
competition policy, it is not enough to give developing countries more time to 
adjust. Rather, new concepts and definitions are needed. The WTO concepts of 
market access, reciprocity, national treatment are shown to be unsuitable for 
examining the implications of competition policy for economic development.  
Specifically, the authors note that the main objective of competition policy in 
advanced country such as the US is promotion of consumer welfare. For 
developing countries, a more appropriate objective would instead be to achieve 
sustained and substantial increases in the trend rate of growth of productivity.  
Such an objective was pursued in Japan in 1950-73.  That country, at the start of 
the period, had a level of per capita income similar to that of many developing 
countries today but attained exceptionally high growth in the subsequent two 
decades.  The Japanese experience of this earlier post-world war II era with 
respect to competition and industrial policy is particularly useful for developing 
countries. 
 
Promotion of high rates of growth of productivity necessitates high rates of 
investment which, in turn, in a mixed economy, requires maintaining the private 
sector’s propensity to invest.  Singh and Dhumale show that this needs an 
optimal degree of competition rather than maximum competition. They 
emphasise, in case of developing countries, that keeping the private sector’s 
propensity to invest at high levels requires a steady growth of profits.  This 
would necessitate government co-ordination of investment decisions to prevent 
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over-capacity and falling profits. The authors therefore outline the concept of an 
optimal combination of competition and co-operation to achieve fast long-term 
growth. They also introduced the concept of simulated competition, i.e. contests 
for state support which can be as powerful as real market competition. 
 
Singh and Dhumale add that these concepts are new only in relation to the 
current discourse at the WTO and at other international organisation on the 
subject. The concepts are derived from modern economic theory and have been 
tested by empirical evidence. Interestingly, some of the concepts have been used 
in the WTO Agreements themselves, but usually to benefit rich rather than poor 
countries . For example the TRIPS Agreement allows temporary restraint on 
free competition in order to promote technical progress. However, the extra 
patent protection provided under the WTO Agreements benefits mainly rich 
countries who hold or produce most of the world’s patents. At one level, all that 
Singh and Dhumale do is to apply such concepts to the advantage of developing 
countries in order to promote their economic development. 
 
To sum up, there are two important implications following from the above 
analysis which deserve emphasis. Firstly, developing countries do need a 
competition policy but that policy needs to be specific to the relevant stage of a 
country’s development. Secondly there is a need for special and differential 
treatment of developing countries in relation to competition policy. This is 
required in order to truly ‘level the playing field’ in an operational sense.  Even 
large developing country firms tend to be both relatively small and also 
handicapped by the many deficits that arise from economic underdevelopment 
as compared to the large multi-national firms from advanced countries.  In these 
circumstances, instead of ‘national treatment’ of foreign multi-national firms, a 
developing country competition authority may prohibit takeovers by such 
companies operating in the country and yet allow domestic firms to amalgamate 
in order to compete better against the larger multinationals. In this instance, 
non-national treatment may serve both competition and economic development. 
 
However, even the development friendly competition policy sketched out above 
may not be adequate to cope with the potential anti-competitive effects of the 
current international merger wave. For this, ideally, an international competition 
authority is required to be able to prevent abuse of dominant position by large 
multinational firms and other anti-competition behaviour.  The need for such an 
authority arises from the fact that even an advanced country like the US, with all 
its paraphernalia of competition laws and its extra-territoriality, is unable to 
prevent price fixing by international cartels.  Not to long ago, a European cartel 
of vitamin producers was fined three quarters of a billion dollars for illegally 
fixing (high) prices.  If this can happen to the US, there would be little to 
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prevent cartelisation by subsidiaries of multi-national companies in developing 
countries and for them to engage in similar activities.  In the absence of an 
international competition authority, which the advanced countries are not as yet 
prepared to accept, developing countries would be better off in dealing with 
anti-competitive behaviour of large multinationals collectively, through regional 
organisations, rather than on an individual basis.17
 
XI. Summary and Conclusions 
This study has examined analytical, empirical and policy issues of particular 
interest to developing countries in two areas: corporate governance and 
competition policy.  These subjects are not currently at the top of the agenda for 
most of these countries.  Nevertheless, these matters are being considered by 
several international bodies including the WTO, the World Bank and the OECD 
in the context of the proposals for the New International Financial Architecture 
and the new liberalized trading system.  These international organizations do 
not, however, always act in the interest of developing countries.  The latter 
therefore need independent analyses of these issues so as to be able to properly 
assess the proposed reforms from their own perspective and, when necessary, 
offer alternative proposals.  The main purpose of this paper has been to provide 
such an independent assessment and to raise the consciousness of developing 
countries about these issues. 
 
The principal conclusions on corporate governance may be summarised as 
follows: 
 
1. The main premise of the IMF and leading U.S. officials that the deeper 
causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate 
governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected countries 
is not supported by the evidence.  The available facts are much more in 
accord with the alternative thesis that the fundamental reason for the 
crisis was the precipitate capital account liberalization that a number of 
these countries had carried out in the period preceding the crisis. 
 
2. Despite claims to the contrary, the system of corporate governance 
favoured by the OECD and World Bank is the arm’s-length model found 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.  The codes of best practice 
and the self-assessment exercises reflect this preference and it is thus 
likely to form the basis of these organisations’ advice to developing 
countries, especially when conditionality is imposed in times of crisis. 
 
3. The arm’s length model of the relationship between business, banks and 
the  government, as found in its ideal form in the U.S. and the U.K., is 
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deeply embedded in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and corporate law. It is 
particularly suitable for the Berle and Means corporate law pattern of 
dispersed share ownership typically observed in large corporations in 
these countries.  
 
The Berle and Means corporation has specific governance problems, 
deriving from the separation of ownership and control. These lead to the 
well-known  problematique of the principal-agent relationships between 
shareholders and managers, involving concepts of agency costs, 
asymmetric information and incomplete contracting.  
 
However, the Berle and Means pattern of ownership is by far the 
exception in developing countries and in much of continental Europe.  In 
these countries, the most prevalent form of ownership is family control.  
The corporate governance issues for large firms in these countries are, 
therefore, quite different from those of Anglo-Saxon economies.  The 
family-based systems of corporate governance are often associated with 
relationship banking.  A priori, there is no reason to believe that such 
systems are necessarily inferior to the arm’s length stock-market based 
Anglo-Saxon model.  Both have positive and negative features.  To the 
extent that the former systems are better able to resolve the agency 
problems, suffer much less from the short-termism and speculative 
bubbles of the stock market based model, they are arguably more 
conducive to long-term economic development of emerging countries. 
Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as European 
countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of 
fast long-term growth with these systems, indeed superior to those of 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
4. However, in the wake of the Asian financial crises, family-based 
corporate control systems have been associated with crony capitalism, 
measured in one important sense in terms of control of a large proportion 
of national wealth by a small number of corporate families.  Whether 
such crony capitalism leads to moral hazards and economic instability, or 
instead helps resolve co-ordination problems ubiquitous in a market 
economy, is pre-eminently an empirical question.  Empirical evidence 
presented in this paper indicates that there is no relationship between 
crony capitalism and the Asian economic crisis. Countries with and 
without a high incidence of crony capitalism experienced the crisis.  
Similarly, there are examples of both kinds of countries which escaped 
the crisis. 
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5. The theoretical foundations of the OECD/World Bank proposals can be 
found in the contributions of LLSV.  The basic proposition of the LLSV 
approach is that the legal protection afforded to investors (primarily 
minority shareholders) determines the availability of external finance.  If 
minority shareholders are protected, external finance will become more 
prevalent which will have beneficial effects of investment and, ultimately, 
growth.  The LLSV studies are an important contribution to our 
knowledge of legal systems and corporate governance structures and their 
relation to financing and growth.  However, it is argued in this study that 
LLSV’s conclusions are overstated.  In particular, it is argued that the 
approach is far too narrow to adequately capture the changes taking place 
in corporate finance in developing countries and, furthermore, that legal 
structure and corporate finance jointly interact and the direction of 
causality is not simply from the former to the latter.  The LLSV approach 
also elevates shareholders and creditors above other stakeholders in the 
firm and relegates other important relationships (such as the relationships 
between workers and management and suppliers and the firm) to 
secondary status.   
 
6. Corporate finance patterns in developing countries in the 1990s were 
broadly similar to those in the 1980s in a number of important aspects.  
Large developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on 
external sources to finance their growth of total assets.  Contrary to the 
“pecking order” theory, large firms in many developing countries financed 
more of their growth through issuance of equity on stock markets than 
through retained profits.  Stock markets have thus helped large firms to 
raise considerable amounts of external finance, but whether this has led to 
higher national saving rates is unclear. The effects of stock market 
development on corporate governance and development depends on two 
market processes: (a) the nature and efficiency of the takeover mechanism 
and (b) that of the pricing process.  This paper has argued that there is a 
wealth of evidence that the latter is often dominated by speculation, 
herding and fads that undermine its capacity to efficiently direct the 
allocation of resources.  It has also been suggested that the takeover 
mechanism is inherently flawed and an expensive method of changing 
corporate governance.  Furthermore, it was pointed out that the 
inadequacies and perverse incentives in both the pricing process and the 
takeover mechanism are likely to be exacerbated in developing countries. 
 
7. In the wake of the Asian crisis, it has been argued that developing country 
conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and, because they are 
“too big to fail”, create moral hazard.  The analysis of this paper indicates 
 57
that conglomerates are in fact an efficient response to inadequacies in 
developing country labour, capital and product markets.  Far from being 
inefficient, conglomerates have been instrumental in overcoming market 
imperfections and promoting industrialization.  The high leverage of 
developing country conglomerates was shown to be not out of line with 
that of many firms in advanced markets, and, given the ambiguities of 
what constitutes the “optimal” debt/equity ratio it is difficult to say that 
they are necessarily too high.  The conglomerates’ difficulties with debt 
during the Asian crisis arose from their unmonitored and uncontrolled 
exposure to short-term external credit rather than from their high debt-
equity ratios per se.  These elements – government monitoring and control 
of capital movements – which were central to the traditional state guided 
economic systems in these countries had been abandoned and, as noted 
earlier, replaced by capital account liberalisation in the period 
immediately preceding the crises 
 
8. Apart from poor corporate governance, it was argued that inadequate 
competition between large firms in developing country markets was a 
contributing “deep” reason for the Asian crisis.  However, empirical 
evidence examined in this paper suggests that this preconception is also 
greatly at variance with facts.  A comparative analysis of the relative 
persistence of corporate rates of return in emerging markets and in 
advanced economies indicates that the former displayed lower profits 
persistency than the latter.  This suggests that product market competition 
is no less intense in emerging markets than in advanced economies, 
subjecting developing country managers to market discipline.   
 
9. This paper suggests that despite this competitive environment, developing 
countries must develop effective competition policies because of (a) 
extensive privatisation of state-owned enterprises including natural 
monopolies; and (b) the current huge international merger wave.  The 
latter imposes important new challenges to developing countries both to 
protect themselves from the potentially anti-competitive behaviour of 
mammoth multinationals as well as to provide space for their own national 
firms to grow.  In the face of mergers between huge multinationals, even 
developed countries have had to enforce competition policies more 
diligently.  The merger between McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing 
compelled the European Union competition authorities to intervene, while 
the cornering of the US vitamin market by a European cartel obliged US 
authorities to enforce competition by imposing the largest-ever anti-trust 
fine of three-quarters of a billion dollars on cartel members.  Given that 
large developed economies can be subject to such actual or potential anti-
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competitive behaviour, smaller and more open developing countries are 
far more vulnerable. 
   
10. However, contrary to the approach being advanced by the WTO that 
would allow no special or differential treatment of developing countries, 
this paper argues that from the perspective of economic development, 
these countries must be allowed to tailor their competition policy to suit 
their specific circumstances.  In particular, they should not be compelled 
to extend national treatment to multinational enterprises since the presence 
of these huge concerns in developing countries may reduce competition by 
driving smaller national competitors from the market.  The US model of 
competition policy stresses maximum competition, whereas the optimal 
policy for developing countries must contain a more subtle blend of 
competition and cooperation.   
In sum, this paper has argued that there is a diversity of corporate governance 
systems that have proved effective in different national contexts.  The 
continental Europeans and the Japanese have prospered with alternative 
corporate governance systems that have given a larger voice to stakeholders in 
the firm and have afforded relatively less protection to outside investors.   The 
system of corporate governance in the US and the U.K. is clearly not the only 
way to effectively and efficiently run the corporate economy and, indeed, for 
developing countries it is far from being the best way.  Its reliance on the stock 
market and consequently on that market’s pricing process and takeover 
mechanism creates perverse incentives that can undermine long-term growth by 
accentuating the influence of short-term considerations.   
 
In place of a drive by international organizations to promote the Anglo-Saxon 
system of corporate governance around the world, what is needed is a genuine 
recognition that there are many competing systems of corporate governance and 
it must be left to developing countries to decide which one is optimal for their 
particular circumstances.  Above all, what is required is an analysis of corporate 
governance structures underpinned by a solid factual understanding of these 
systems in economic development.  It must be free of the ideology and 
prejudice that reflexively argues that conglomerates are bad, that competition in 
developing markets is inadequate and that any corporate governance system 
other than the Anglo-Saxon model is intrinsically flawed. 
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Notes 
 
 
 
1 See, for example, the document “Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code” 
published by the Confederation of Indian Industry (1998). 
2 Note that control is defined as a 20% or higher share of equity.  
3   See further the discussion in the next section as well as Amsden (1989, 
2000). 
4 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
5 For a comparison of growth rates in advanced economies, see Maddison 
(1991).  The comparison above was based on Table 3.1 on p.49.  French 
growth over the period 1870-1989 was 1.8% (annual average compound 
growth rate), which compares favourably with the U.K. (1.4%) and the 
US (1.8%). The argument in the text applies only to the LLSV thesis in 
its strong ahistorical form.  The thesis can be expressed in a weaker 
version which would state that the Anglo-Saxon form of corporate 
governance is most conducive to growth under certain historical 
circumstances, but not in others.  However, LLSV do not explicitly make 
any such historical distinction.  
6 For a fuller discussion of these measurement biases see Whittington, Saporta 
and Singh (1997). 
7 Benjamin Graham, in his classic work on security analysis noted that "The 
stock market is a voting machine rather than a weighing machine." 
(Graham, 1934,p.452). 
8 See collection of studies in Porter 1992. 
9  Of course, there is also a positive feedback loop between the two markets, 
with higher stock market valuations leading to capital inflows and an 
appreciating exchange rate.  It is thus possible that a stock market bubble 
will lead to an overvalued real exchange rate that in turn affects the 
competitiveness of the tradeable sector. 
10 See further Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) on this point. 
11 This is Guy Pfefferman’s phrase. See Singh (1995a). 
12 See further Amsden and Hikino (1994), Singh (1995b) 
13 In some countries, Business Group’s are organised along the lines of holding 
companies, i.e., the leading company either directly or through 
pyramiding holds a controlling equity stake in the affiliated company.   In 
other countries, the affiliated companies are not bound by large equity 
stakes, but more by social ties, ethnic origin or firm history (such as the 
Japanese keiretsu).  For a fuller discussion, see Khanna (2000). 
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14 The classic reference here are Mueller 1986 and 1990, the latter is a collection 
of studies for a large number of advanced economies.  See also Waring 
(1996), Goddard and Wilson (1999). 
15 Such unfair competition may be ameliorated by a strict enforcement of  
'national treatment' which is not always observed even in advanced 
countries. 
16 For a discussion of MAI see Singh and Zammit 1998. 
17  An early international 'initiative' in this area was the discussion of  restrictive 
business practices by large multinationals at UNCTAD II in New Delhi in 
1968, and at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in 1976. The UN General Assembly 
in December 1980 adopted by Resolution 35/63, a "set of Multi-laterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for theControl ofRestrictive 
Business Practices".  However, this is not a legally binding document and 
has not bee helpful to developing countries (see Correa, 1999). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Following is a summary of the set of Principles of Corporate Governance laid 
out by the OECD and quoted from Iskander and Chamlou (2000): 
 
• The rights of shareholders (and others) to receive relevant information about 
the company in a timely manner, to have the opportunity to participate in 
decision concerning fundamental corporate changes, and to share in the 
profits of the corporation, among others.  Markets for corporate control, 
should be efficient and transparent, and share-holders should consider the 
costs and benefits of exercising their voting rights. 
 
• Equitable treatment of shareholders, especially minority and foreign 
shareholders, with full disclosure of material information and prohibition of 
abusive self-dealing and insider trading.  All shareholders of the same class 
should be treated equally.  Members of the board and managers should be 
required to disclose any material interest in transactions. 
 
• Recognition of the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, as 
established by law.  The corporate governance framework should encourage 
active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
wealth, jobs and financially sound enterprises. 
 
• Timely and accurate disclosure and transparency on all matters material to 
company performance, ownership, and governance and relating to other 
issues such as employment and stakeholders.  Financial information should 
be independently audited and prepared to high standards of quality. 
 
• The responsibilities of the board for the strategic guidance of the company, 
the effective monitoring of management, and accounting ability to the 
company and shareholders. 
 
